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Abstract
Cryptography with restricted conditions refers to cryptographic primitives with spe-
cial requirements or conditions. For example, a proxy signature scheme only allows a
proxy signer with valid delegation to issue signatures on behalf of the original signer,
while for k-time anonymous authentication, a service provider can be ensured that
a user can only have anonymous access to the services for up to k-times. Due to the
different requirements in various types of security systems, more and more crypto-
graphic primitives with new features are emerging. In this thesis, we study several
cryptographic primitives with restricted conditions and their applications, including
proxy signature and its variant in the attribute-based setting, oblivious transfer,
k-time anonymous authentication and their applications in the e-coupon systems.
To address the problem that a proxy signer might abuse the delegated signing
right from the original signer, in this thesis, we present a k-time proxy signature
scheme that only permits a designated proxy signer to generate a pre-determined
number of proxy signatures. In the subsequent work, we implement proxy signature
in attribute-based setting, that is, an original signer with a set of attributes can
delegate his signing right to a proxy signer with a normal public and private key
pair. One interesting feature of the proposed scheme is that by verifying a proxy
signature, the public can be convinced the signature is generated by the proxy signer
with valid deletion from the original signer whose attributes satisfy a pre-claimed
predicate. Then we identify one attack that has been neglected in many existing
delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes. We present the details of this attack
and propose a general solution that can efficiently thwart the attack.
In this thesis, we also construct several e-coupon systems with new properties.
In the first e-coupon system, the user identity privacy would be revealed if a dis-
honest user requests more than pre-determined number of services specified in the
coupon. Different from other e-cash and k-time anonymous authentication schemes,
we achieve traceability without involvement of a trusted third party. Besides, for
the first time, we formalize the concept of privacy of purchase, that is, the choices of
the users when redeeming a coupon with the server is hidden. Moreover, we propose
a new oblivious transfer (OT) scheme with retrievable receiver’s privacy and design
another e-coupon system based on our new OT scheme. If a user remains honest,
the user anonymity and privacy of purchase are both well protected. Otherwise, the
identity and purchase privacy of the user can be revealed by the service provider.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography plays a central role in ensuring the security of data in storage and
transmission. Roughly speaking, cryptography is an inclusive field covering a wide
range of topics from encryption, signature, authentication to zero-knowledge proof,
which provide the vital security properties like confidentiality, integrity, non-reputation
and authenticity. In many real-world applications such as e-cash [CFN88], e-coupon
[CES+05], e-voting [Buc04] and trial browsing [TFS04], besides the security prop-
erties mentioned above, there are some special requirements and conditions such as
restricting the number of times that a user can access to the services. In this thesis,
we investigate some cryptography primitives with restricted conditions.
1.1 Background
A valid digital signature convinces a recipient that the message was sent by a claimed
sender and the message was not altered in transit, while the sender cannot deny
having sent the message later. Digital signature has been applied widely in software
distribution, financial transactions, and in other cases where it is important to ensure
the authenticity, integrity and non-reputation. Proxy signature is a special type of
digital signature, where an original signer (or delegator) can delegate his/her signing
right to a proxy signer. Thereafter, the proxy signer can sign documents on behalf
of the original signer. Roughly speaking, a secure proxy signature scheme should
satisfy the following requirements.
• Verifiability: Given a proxy signature, a verifier can be convinced that the proxy
signature is indeed a valid signature generated by the proxy signer with proper
delegation from an original signer on the signed message.
• Identifiability: Given a proxy signature, a verifier is able to determine the iden-
tities of the corresponding original signer and proxy signer.
• Unforgeablity: No one, except the designated proxy signer, can create a valid
proxy signature.
• Undenability: A proxy signer can not deny at a later time on a proxy signature
that he has created before.
• Prevention of misuse: It is required in the first type of proxy signature schemes
that the proxy signing key can not be used for purposes other than creating proxy
1
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signatures. Once misused, the identity of the misbehaving proxy signer can be
determined explicitly.
Proxy signature and its extended variants have been found very useful in many
practical applications, such as distributed systems [Neu93], grid computing [FKTT98],
and mobile agent applications [LKK01b].
Attribute-based signature (ABS) is another special type of digital signature
that has been proposed recently. It can be treated as an extension of identity-based
signature (IBS) but has better fine-grained control over the signer’s identification
information. In an ABS, a signer with attribute set A will first obtain a secret key
from the central authority (or key generation center), and then can use the obtained
secret key to sign any messages. The signature can be verified with regards to an
attribute predicate Υ and the verification will be successful if and only if the signer’s
attribute set A satisfies Υ. However, the verifier cannot gain any information about
the signer’s attributes except the fact that they satisfy the pre-claimed predicate.
ABS has been found useful in the circumstances where the capabilities of the
users depend on certain combinations of their attributes. Attribute-based proxy sig-
nature (ABPS) is a nature extension of ABS. Compared with normal proxy signature
(PKI-based setting), the users in ABPS are identified by attributes. ABPS has many
potential applications, for example, attribute-based authentication [MPR11]. Con-
sider a database whose access control is described in a policy such that only users
who hold authorised attribute keys can access it. An authorised user can delegate
his/her signing rights to another user so that the latter can also access the database
and collect information when the former is not available.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives
that has been used widely in various security applications such as exchange of se-
crets [Rab81], contract signing [EGL85], secure multiparty computation [Yao82] and
private information retrieval [CKGS98]. An oblivious transfer scheme is an inter-
active protocol running between a sender with a set of messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}
and a receiver with a set of choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. After running the protocol, the
receiver learns the intended messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk but cannot learn anything
about mi for i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. Meanwhile, the receiver’s choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}
are completely hidden from the sender.
An electronic coupon (or e-coupon) can be used by a user to obtain an electronic
good or service from a service provider, which is usually a coupon issuer. E-coupon
systems are similar but different from electronic cash (or e-cash) systems [CFN88,
NMV97, Bra93, AWSM07]. One major difference is that an e-coupon system only
involves two parties: the user and the coupon issuer, while in an e-cash system there
is a third party which is the bank. An e-coupon system has less algorithms/protocols
compared with e-cash. The coupon issuer can issue a coupon to a user through a
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coupon issuing algorithm; then the user can redeem the coupon at a later time to
obtain the good/service specified in the coupon. Similar to e-cash systems, e-coupon
systems are very useful in e-commerce, especially when the shops don’t want to have
the bank involved in the transactions.
1.2 Motivations and Our Results
In this thesis, we focus on certain cryptographic primitives with constrained condi-
tions including proxy signature, oblivious transfer, k-time anonymous authentication
and their applications. The main motivations and our results are summarized as
follows.
1. k-Time proxy signature. In proxy signature, one practical issue is how
to prevent the proxy signers from misusing the signing ability delegated by
the original signer. One solution in existing certificate-based proxy signature
schemes [LKK01b, XZF05, Wan05, HSMW06, YMS+12] is to specify the va-
lidity period of the delegation in the warrant (which is essentially a signature
of the original signer). In this thesis, we propose a new k-time proxy signature
scheme, in which a proxy signer is only able to generate a constant number
of proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer. We provide a formal and
complete treatment for multi-time (or k-time) proxy signature schemes. We
first provide a formal security model for such schemes. Then we propose a
new k-time proxy signature scheme based on the Schnorr signature scheme
and verifiable secret sharing. In our scheme, the original signer can specify in
the warrant the number of proxy signatures a proxy signer can produce. If the
proxy signer produces more than predetermined number of proxy signatures,
his/her private key can be computed by the public. We prove the security of
the proposed scheme under the random oracle model.
2. Attribute-based signing right delegation. Attribute-based signature is
a new primitive that has been found useful in many real-world applications
[MPR11]. Attribute-based proxy signature is a natural extension of ABS. Con-
sider the aforementioned attribute-based access control for a database where
only users who hold certain attributes can access the data. An authorised user
can delegate his/her signing right to another user so that the latter can also
access the database and collect information when the former is not available.
The delegated signer is called a proxy of the original signer. In our proposed
scheme, the verifier can be convinced that a valid proxy signer holds the right
delegation from an authorised original signer and therefore can access the
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database. We define the security models for ABPS and propose a threshold
ABPS scheme that is proven secure under the proposed security models.
3. Improving the security of delegation-by-warrant proxy signature
schemes. Among all the constructions of proxy signature, the delegation-by-
warrant method has gained the most popularity. A large number of delegation-
by-warrant proxy signature schemes [Zha97, LKK01b, Wan05, HSMW06] have
been proposed. These delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes can be
further classified into two categories according to whether the proxy signature
is generated by the proxy signer using his own private key or not. In the first
type, the proxy signer generates a new proxy signing key using the delegation
information and his own private key. The proxy signatures are generated under
the new proxy signing key. The proxy signature schemes in [Zha97, LKK01b,
Wan05, LYMW13] fall into the first type. In the second type, the proxy signer
issues a proxy signature using his own private key. The proxy signatures are
essentially combinations of the original signer’s signature on the warrant and
the proxy signer’s signature on the message. Such proxy signature schemes
could be found in [HSMW06, LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a]. We
show that an attack has been neglected by the second type of proxy signature
schemes proposed in the literature. Our attack is based on a realistic assump-
tion that an adversary has access to the original signer and the proxy signer’s
standard signatures. We show that under such a circumstance, many proxy
signature schemes [HSMW06, LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a] that
have been proven secure are in fact insecure.
We demonstrate the attack by launching it against an identity-based proxy
signature scheme [WMS+07] that has been proven secure. We show that a ma-
licious adversary can create a proxy signature on a message, if he has access to
the standard signatures of the original signer and the proxy signer. Thus, these
proxy signature schemes [HSMW06, LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a],
which we believe is not a complete list, are in fact insecure under the cir-
cumstance we consider. We then propose an efficient solution to modify the
identity-based proxy signature scheme [WMS+07] in order to thwart this at-
tack. It is worth noting that the same method can also be applied to other
proxy signatures [HSMW06, LKZC07, SXYM11, LMY14a] to resist the attack.
4. An efficient privacy-preserving e-coupon system. There have been a
number of e-coupon systems [CES+05, Ngu06b, CGH06] proposed in the lit-
erature. Although user anonymity has been considered in all the above e-
coupon systems, none of them has considered traceability against dishonest
users. That is, if a dishonest user redeems a multi-coupon more than the pre-
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determined number of times, it is desirable to allow the coupon issuer to trace
the identity of the user. On the other hand, for honest users, we should ensure
that their identities will remain anonymous to the coupon issuer.
Another desirable feature of an e-coupon system is user privacy (privacy of
purchase). Different from user anonymity, here we are concerning the privacy
of the goods/services chosen by the users during the redemption process. In
general, an e-coupon can contain a number of options that have the same value
and a user can choose any one of them. If the shop can know the good/service
chosen by the user in the redemption process, then it is possible for the shop to
link two redemptions performed by the same customer (e.g., a customer may
prefer to redeem the same item among several transactions). Therefore, it is
also desirable to keep the buying behavior of a user secret from the coupon
issuer. It is worth noting that user privacy is possible in the electronic world
since we are considering electronic goods, so there is no physical reduction of
the goods from the shop’s ‘warehouse’, while in the physical world, the shop
can always trace the number of each good to find out the item redeemed by
the user.
We propose a new e-coupon system, which can achieve all the desirable prop-
erties, namely unforgeability, anonymity for honest users, double redemption
detection, traceability against dishonest users, and user privacy. It is worth
noting that different from a fair e-cash system [SPC95], the traceability in
our e-coupon system is performed by the merchant (i.e., coupon issuer) rather
than the bank.
5. Oblivious transfer with retrievable receiver’s privacy. Oblivious trans-
fer (OT) has served as a useful primitive in designing privacy-preserving sys-
tems in which the choices of the users should be hidden. All the previous
research on OT aimed to design OT schemes with unconditional receiver and
sender privacy. However, in real-world applications [AIR01, LMY14b], it is
desirable for the sender to trace the choices of the receiver if they misbehave.
Thus, the previous OT schemes are not suitable in these scenarios. We propose
a new OT scheme with retrievable receiver’s privacy such that the privacy of an
honest receiver is protected unconditionally while all the previous choices of a
misbehaving receiver can be revealed by the sender if the receiver makes more
than the pre-determined number of choices in the OT protocol. We prove the
security of the proposed OT scheme under the half-simulation model [NP05].
6. Efficient e-coupon systems with strong user privacy. We propose two
novel e-coupon systems supporting multiple usage of an electronic coupon.
Besides the security requirements mentioned above, our e-coupon systems can
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achieve two new properties. First, the proposed e-coupon systems allows an
honest user to redeem a valid coupon for up to k times, where k is a pre-
determined number set by the coupon issuer. Besides, if a malicious user
attempts redeeming a coupon for more than k times, both the identity privacy
and redemption privacy could be traced by the coupon issuer. We also define
the formal security models for these new security requirements, and show that
our new e-coupon systems are proven secure in the proposed models.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review some previous research on proxy signature, attribute-
based signature, oblivious transfer and e-coupon systems.
In Chapter 3, we review some background knowledge in cryptography. We
introduce the concept of cyclic group, bilinear pairing, Lagrange interpolation and
present the complexity assumptions used in this thesis. Besides, we introduce some
basic cryptographic primitives such as digital signature, proxy signature, public key
encryption, and so on.
In Chapter 4, we propose a k-time proxy signature scheme which can restrict the
number of proxy signature generated by a proxy signer in the name of an original
signer. We present the formal definition and security model for k-time proxy sig-
nature. We prove the security of the proposed scheme under the proposed security
model using random oracle.
In Chapter 5, we introduce an attribute-based proxy signature scheme exploiting
public key-based proxy signature and attribute-based signature. We first present the
formal definition and security model of ABPS. Then we analyse the security of the
proposed scheme under the proposed security model.
In Chapter 6, we present an attack to one type of delegation-by-warrant proxy
signature schemes. We take a concrete ID-based proxy signature scheme as an exam-
ple to explain how the attack works. Then we propose an improved scheme, in which
we propose a solution that can also be applied to other proxy signature schemes to
prevent the attack. We prove the security of the improved scheme to demonstrate
that the improved scheme is not only secure under the previous adversarial model
by also can resist the new attack.
In Chapter 7, we design a privacy-preserving e-coupon system with some new
properties. We first present the formal definition and security model of such an e-
coupon system, in which we formalize two new properties about user privacy (privacy
of purchase) and traceability. We then construct an e-coupon system that can
achieve all the security properties. We analyze the security of the proposed e-coupon
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system and show that it is secure under the defined security model.
In Chapter 8, we present two new oblivious transfer schemes with retrievable
receiver’s privacy (OTRRP). We first introduce the formal definition and security
model for OTRRP. Then we present two different constructions of OTRRP. We
analyse the security of the proposed OTRRP schemes and prove that they are secure
under the half-simulation model.
In Chapter 9, we design another two e-coupon systems that support multiple-
usage of an electronic coupon. We first present the formal definition and security
model for the new e-coupon system. Then we construct two new e-coupon systems
achieving different security properties. We prove that the proposed e-coupon systems
are secure under the defined security model.
In Chapter 10, we conclude this thesis and present some future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we review prior research on some cryptography primitives with
restricted conditions, including proxy signature, attribute-based signature, oblivious
transfer and e-coupon systems.
2.1 Proxy Signature
Proxy signature was first proposed by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996 [MUO96].
In their work they presented three different methods in constructing proxy signa-
ture schemes, namely full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant.
It has been shown impractical to construct proxy signature schemes by means of
full delegation since an original signer has to handle his own secret to the proxy
signer. Partial delegation proxy signature schemes can be further divided into
proxy-protected and proxy-unprotected schemes according to whether a verifier can
decide the proxy signature is generated by a proxy signer or the original signer.
In a subsequent work, Kim et al. [KPW97] proposed a new type of proxy signa-
ture combining partial delegation and warrant. They further showed that such a
combination can provide a higher level of security. Since then many proxy signa-
ture schemes based on partial delegation and warrant have been proposed (e.g.,
[LKK01b, XZF05, Wan05, HSMW06, YMS+12]).
Lee et al. [LKK01b] presented several attacks against previous proxy signature
schemes and constructed a novel strong non-designated proxy signature scheme,
which could be used in multi-proxy signature. Besides, the authors provides new
classifications of proxy signatures, namely strong and weak proxy signatures, des-
ignated and non-designated proxy signature and self-proxy signature. Xu et al.
[XZF05] extended proxy signature into identity-based setting, where a user is iden-
tified by some unique information about the identity of the user (e.g. user’s email
address). They also proposed the sound security models for proxy signature in
identity-based setting and the first identity-based proxy signature scheme proven
secure using random oracles. Wang proposed a designated-verifier proxy signature
scheme from two-party Schnorr signature and analyzed its security in [Wan05]. In
addition, the author discussed weaker designated-verifier proxy signature and strong
designated-verifier proxy signature as an extension of [LKK01b], with the difference
that the proxy signature could only be verified by the designated verifier instead of
the public. Huang et al. [HSMW06] proposed the first proxy signature scheme that
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the security is not relied on random oracle. However, the proposed proxy signature
scheme do not support strong unforgeability, which means any one could produce
a new proxy signature after seeing a proxy signature and the corresponding mes-
sage. Yong et al. [YMS+12] proposed a proxy signature scheme whose security is
based on the integer factorization problem in the random oracle, which are different
from proxy signature schemes mentioned above whose security relying on discrete
logarithm problem and its variants.
Besides proxy signature schemes mentioned above, many extensions on proxy
signature have also been proposed according to different application needs, such as
threshold proxy signature [Zha97], blind proxy signature [ZSNL], one-time proxy
signature [MH05], and so on. Threshold proxy signature, also known as multi-
proxy signature, enables an original signer to delegate his signing right to multiple
proxy signers. The proxy signers need to work together in order to produce a valid
proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. One-time proxy signature puts
strict restrictions on the signing capability of a proxy signer, who is only allowed
to generate one valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. Blind proxy
signature allows a user to obtain a valid signature on a message in a way that the
proxy signer learns neither the message nor the resulting signature.
In proxy signature, one important problem is to prevent the proxy signers from
abusing the signing ability from the original signer. The conventional solution is
to specify the valid time period of the delegation in the warrant. When a verifier
examines a proxy signature, he first checks the warrant to verifiy if the proxy signa-
ture falls into the valid time period. However, this is not sufficient since a malicious
proxy signer can still produce a large number of proxy signatures in a short period if
his computation power is strong enough. It is worth noticing proxy signature with
revocation [LHH05, DSP07] has been proposed as an independent work to allow
an original signer to revoke the signing rights from a proxy signer whenever it is
necessary. However, the proposed proxy signature schemes are still suffering to the
problem mentioned above.
2.2 Attribute-Based Signature
Attribute-based signature is treated as an extension of identity-based signature
[Sha84] by allowing the identity of a user to be a set of descriptive attributes rather
than a single unique string. Several ABS schemes supporting different types of
predicates have been proposed after the concept of attribute-based cryptography
was proposed in [SW05]. Li and Kim [LK08] proposed two attribute-based ring
signature schemes. In their construction, the ring is formed by the users with a set
of same attributes. In this way, the identity of the signer could be hidden in the
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ring. However, as one of the basic properties, ABS has already enforced anonymity.
Essentially, ring and group are comparable to special cases of ABS. In a subse-
quent work, Li et al. [LAS+10] proposed two ABS constructions supporting flexible
threshold predicates. In their schemes, the predicate is a set of n attributes, and the
signer must possess at least k (k ≤ n) of them in order to generate a valid signature.
The verifier can be convinced that the signer is really holding k out of n attributes,
but cannot find out which k attributes are possessed by the signer. Later, Maji et
al. [MPR11] proposed another ABS scheme where the attribute predicates can be
expressed as monotone-span programs. Then in [OT14], Okamoto and Takashima
proposed the first ABS scheme that can support more general non-monotone pred-
icates.
ABS has been found useful in the circumstances where the capabilities of the
users depend on certain combinations of their attributes. Attribute-based proxy sig-
nature (ABPS) is a nature extension of ABS. Compared with normal proxy signature
(PKI-based setting), the users in ABPS are identified by attributes. ABPS has many
potential applications, for example, attribute-based authentication [MPR11]. Con-
sider a database whose access control is described in a policy such that only users
who hold authorised attribute keys can access it. An authorised user can delegate
his/her signing rights to another user so that the latter can also access the database
and collect information when the former is not available.
2.3 Oblivious Transfer
An oblivious transfer scheme is an interactive protocol running between a sender
with messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and a receiver with choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. After
running the protocol, the receiver learns the intended messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk
but cannot learn anything about mi for i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. Meanwhile, the re-
ceiver’s choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} are completely hidden from the sender.
The concept of oblivious transfer was introduced by Rabin in 1981 [Rab81]. In
their original construction, the sender sends a single bit 0 or 1 to the receiver in
such a way that with 1/2 probability the receiver will receive the same bit and with
1/2 probability that the receiver will receive nothing. At the same time, the sender
has no idea whether the receiver receives the message or not. Since then, oblivious
transfer has attracted a lot of attentions, and a number of works [EGL85, BCR86,
NP99, CT05, CNS07] have been done to improve the original OT scheme in different
aspects.
Even et al. [EGL85] proposed a 1-out-of-2 OT (OT12) scheme, in which the
sender obliviously sends a message mi, i ∈ {0, 1}, to the receiver. Shortly after that,
Brassard et al. [BCR86] extended the OT12 [EGL85] to a more general k-out-of-n
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(OTkn) setting, where the receiver is able to make multiple choices mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk
(σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k) from a set of n messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} held by
the sender, meanwhile the receiver’s choices remain oblivious to the sender. Since
then, many subsequent works [MZV02, CT05] aimed to design more efficient OTkn
schemes. Different from normal OTkn, another important research direction on OT
is adaptive OTkn [NP99]. In adaptive OT
k
n, the receiver can choose the messages
adaptively, namely, the i-th value chosen by the receiver depends on the first i− 1
values.
In the early OT schemes reviewed above, there is no condition on restricting
the receiver’s ability. Any user in the system can act as a receiver and run the OT
protocol to choose messages held by the sender obliviously. To address this problem,
Coull et al. [CGH09] proposed an OT scheme supporting access control using state
graphs, where for every transaction, the state of the receiver shifts from one to
another. The receiver can access the protected services only if some of his states
are not used. Camenisch et al. [CDN09] proposed another approach to enforce
access control. In their system, the receiver first authenticates himself to a trusted
third party to obtain some credentials. Later, the receiver proves to the sender that
he possesses a valid credential from the third party using zero- knowledge proof.
However, in this construction, the access policy is publicly known. To address
this problem, Camenisch et al. [CDNZ11] proposed another oblivious transfer with
access control in which only the receivers whose attributes satisfy a predicate can
access the services. In order to reduce the computation and communication cost,
Han et al. [HSMY12] proposed two efficient oblivious transfer schemes without
zero-knowledge proof. In addition, different form previous schemes, the receivers
could obtain credentials from a trusted third party but do not have to authenticate
themselves. Thus, the communication and computation cost is lower than previous
schemes supporting access control.
There have been a lot of research works [NP05, CNS07, KN09] on defining
OT security, which can be classified into honest-but-curious model, half-simulation
model [NP05] and full-simulation model [CNS07, KN09], according to whether the
OT scheme can provide simulatable security for the sender and/or receiver. In
the honest-but-curious model, all participants in the protocol are assumed to be
honest, which makes this model too idealistic for practical use. Naor and Pinkas
[NP05] introduced the half-simulation model that allows malicious senders and re-
ceivers. However, in this model, the security of the sender and receiver are considered
separately. Half-simulation model achieves simulatable security for sender privacy
and computationally indistinguishability for receiver privacy. In the full-simulation
model [CNS07, KN09], it achieves simulatable security for both the receiver and
sender.
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However, previous research on oblivious transfer mainly focused on designing
OT with unconditional sender and receiver’s privacy. In real-world applications,
for example in digital content browsing [TFS04], OT can be applied to hide what
contents have been browsed by a user. However, if a user is identified to be malicious,
it is desirable to determine what contents (especially if the contents are sensitive)
have been read by the user. Traditional OT schemes cannot meet the requirement
in this situation.
2.4 Privacy-Preserving E-Coupon Systems
There are a number of e-coupon systems proposed in the literature. Chen et al.
[CES+05] presented a privacy-preserving e-coupon system, in which the users are
allowed to redeem a single e-coupon for a pre-determined number of times. In
order to reduce the cost for issuing and redeeming coupons, Nguyen [Ngu06b] later
presented another more efficient e-coupon system which has constant communication
and computation cost. In [CGH06], Canard et al. also proposed another interesting
multi-coupon system which allows a user to transfer some value of a multi-coupon
to another user.
Although user anonymity has been considered in all the above e-coupon systems,
none of them has considered traceability against dishonest users. That is, if a
dishonest user redeems a multi-coupon more than the pre-determined number of
times, it is desirable to allow the coupon issuer to trace the identity of the user. On
the other hand, for honest users, we should ensure that their identities will remain
anonymous to the coupon issuer.
Another desirable feature of an e-coupon system is user privacy. Different from
user anonymity, here we are concerning the privacy of the goods/services chosen
by the users during the redemption process. In general, an e-coupon can contain
a number of options that have the same value and a user can choose any one of
them. If the shop can know the good/service chosen by the user in the redemption
process, then it is possible for the shop to link two redemptions performed by the
same customer (e.g., a customer may prefer to redeem the same item among several
transactions). Therefore, it is also desirable to keep the buying behavior of a user
secret from the coupon issuer. It is worth noting that user privacy is possible in the
electronic world since we are considering electronic goods, so there is no physical
reduction of the goods from the shop’s ‘warehouse’, while in the physical world, the
shop can always trace the number of each good to find out the item redeemed by
the user.
It is worth noticing that k-time anonymous authentication schemes [TFS04,
Ngu06a] have been proposed independently for applications that need to restrict
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the number of times that users can access to a service. The difference is that a
trusted group manger is involved in these k-time anonymous schemes to achieve
traceability against malicious users. In our e-coupon system, we only require the
system parameters to be generated from a trusted source. The proposed e-coupon
system can trace the dishonest user without involvement of a trusted third party.
Chapter 3
Preliminaries
We introduce some mathematical background about cryptography and some cryp-
tographic primitives that will be used throughout this thesis.
3.1 Mathematical Background
3.1.1 Finite Field
Definition 3.1. A field with finitely many elements is called a finite field (Galois
field). We denote a finite field with n elements by Fn.
3.1.2 Group
Definition 3.2. Let G be a set and suppose that ◦ is a binary operation on G. We
say the pair (G, ◦) is a group if it has the following properties.
• Associativity. The operation ◦ is associative; That is, (g ◦ h) ◦ k = g ◦ (h ◦ k)
for all g, h, k ∈ G.
• identity. There exists an identity for ◦. That is, there exists e ∈ G such that
g ◦ e = e ◦ g for all g ∈ G.
• Invertibility. There exist inverses for ◦. That is, for each g ∈ G, there exists
g−1 ∈ G such that g ◦ g−1 = g−1 ◦ g = e.
• Closure. We say that law of closure holds for ◦. That is, when ◦ acts on two
elements of G the results is also in G.
If G is finite and has n elements, then we call n the order of G and we write
o(G) = n. If G is infinite we say that G has infinite order and we write o(G) =∞.
3.1.3 Abelian Group
Definition 3.3. We say a group (G, ◦) is an Abelian group if it has the following
property.
• Commutativity. The operation ◦ is commutative if g◦h = h◦g for all g, h ∈ G.
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3.1.4 Cyclic group
Definition 3.4. An Abelian group (G, ◦) is cyclic if there exists an element g ∈ G,
for any element h ∈ G, there exists n ∈ N such that h = gn. We call g a generator
of G.
When we mention a group (G, ◦), we usually omit the binary operation ◦ for
simplicity. If the order of a group is a prime number, we call it a prime order
group. It is worth noticing that all groups of prime order are cyclic groups. All
group elements could be generated by a non-identity element in the group. In other
words, all the elements except the identity are generators of the prime order group.
3.1.5 Elliptic Curve
Elliptic curve was suggested by Miller [Mil85] for constructing public-key crypto-
graphic systems.
Definition 3.5. An elliptic curve is a plane curve over a finite field which consists
of the points satisfying the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b, along with a distinguished
point at infinity, denoted by ∞.
• Constants a, b ∈ R satisfying the discriminant 4 = −4a3 − 27b2 6= 0.
• A non-singular elliptic curve is the set E of solutions (x, y) ∈ R×R to the equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b along with a point O, referred to as the point at infinity.
3.1.6 Bilinear Pairing
Definition 3.6. Let G1, G2 be additive groups of prime order p and let G3 be a
multiplicative group of prime order p. e : G1 × G2 → G3 is a bilinear mapping
having the following properties.
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bR) = e(P,R)ab = e(bP, aR) for any P ∈ G1, R ∈ G2 and
a, b ∈ R.
• Non-degeneracy: There exist P ∈ G1, R ∈ G2 such that e(P,R) 6= 1G3.
• Efficiency: e(P,R) can be efficiently calculated for all P ∈ G1, R ∈ G2.
3.1.7 Lagrange Interpolation
Given t points q(1), q(2), ..., q(t) on a t − 1 polynomial q, one could use Lagrange
interpolation [Sha79] to compute q(i) for any i ∈ Zp through
q(i) =
t∑
j=1
q(j)∆j,s(i).
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The Lagrange coefficient ∆j,S(i) of q(j) in the computation of q(i) can be computed
as
∆j,S(i) =
∏
1≤π≤t,π 6=j
i− π
j − π
.
3.2 Complexity Assumptions
We present the complexity assumptions used in this thesis.
3.2.1 Discrete Logarithm Assumption
Definition 3.7. Discrete Logarithm Assumption [McC90]: Let G be a cyclic
group of order p with a generator g, the discrete logarithm problem (DL) states that
given h ∈ G, compute r ∈ Zp such that h = gr.
Define the success probability of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
A in solving the DL problem as:
AdvDLA,G(κ) = Pr(loggh← g, h ∈ G).
Where κ is the security parameter. The discrete logarithm assumption states that
for all PPT algorithm A, AdvDLA,G(loggh)(κ) is negligible in κ.
3.2.2 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Definition 3.8. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem [DH76]:
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q with a generator g. Given g, ga, gb ∈ G
for some random a, b ∈ Zq, compute gab ∈ G. Define the success probability of a
polynomial algorithm A in solving the CDH problem as:
SuccCDHA,G (κ) = Pr[A(g, ga, gb) = gab : a, b ∈R Zq].
Where κ = log(q) is the security parameter. The CDH assumption states that for
any polynomial algorithm adversary A, SuccCDHA,G (κ) is negligible in κ.
3.2.3 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Definition 3.9. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem [Bon98]: Given
a cyclic group G of prime order q with a generator g, the DDH problem states that,
given g, ga, gb, Z ∈ Gq for some unknown a, b ∈ Zq and a random generator g, de-
cide whether Z = gab. Define the success probability of a polynomial algorithm A in
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solving the DDH problem as:
SuccDDHA,Gq (κ) = |Pr[A(Gq, g, g
a, gb, gab) = 1]− Pr[A(Gq, g, ga, gb, Z) = 1]|.
where κ = log(q) is the security parameter, the DDH assumption states that, for any
polynomial algorithm A, SuccDDHA,Gq (κ) is negligible in κ.
3.2.4 One-More Discrete Logarithm Assumption
Definition 3.10. One More Discrete Logarithm Problem (OMDL) [BNPS03]:
Given a cyclic group Gq of order q and g is a generator of Gq, Let DLogg(·) be the
discrete logarithm oracle that takes an element in Gq and returns the discrete loga-
rithm in base g. Let C(·) be a challenge oracle which takes no input and returns a
random element in Gq. Let W1,W2, . . . ,Wt denote the challenges returned by C(·),
we say an OMDL adversary A wins if A can output a sequence of w1, w2, . . . , wt
∈ Zq satisfying gwi = Wi and the number of queries qC make by A to the discrete
logarithm oracle DLog(·) is less than t.
Define the success probability of a polynomial algorithm A in solving the OMDL
problem as:
SuccOMDLA,Gq (κ) = Pr[w1, w2, . . . , wt ← ADLog(·),qC<t(g, (W1,W2, . . . ,Wt ← C(·)))]
the OMDL assumption is that, for any polynomial algorithm A, SuccOMDLA,Gq (κ) is
negligible in κ.
3.2.5 One More Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Definition 3.11. One More Diffie-Hellman (OMDH) Assumption [NP05]:
Given a cyclic group Gq of prime order q and g is a generator of G, let DH(·) be
the Diffie-Hellman oracle that takes X = gx, Y = gy ∈ Gq for some x, y ∈ Zq
and returns the Diffie-Hellman value Z = gxy. Let C(·) be a challenge oracle that
takes no input and returns a random element in Gq. Let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt denote the
challenges returned by C(·), we say an OMDH adversary A wins if A can output
the sequence of Diffie-Hellman values Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt of all DHP instances with input
X, Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , t and the number of queries qdh made by A to the Diffie-Hellman
oracle DH(·) is less than t. Define the success probability of a polynomial algorithm
A in solving the OMDH problem as:
SuccOMDHA,Gq (κ) = Pr[Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt ← ADH(·),qdh<t(X, (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt ← C(·)))]
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the OMDH assumption states that, for any polynomial algorithm A, SuccOMDHA,Gq (κ)
is negligible in κ.
3.2.6 Knowledge of Exponent Assumption
Definition 3.12. Knowledge of Exponent Assumption [BP04]: Given a cyclic
group Gq of order q, for any adversary A that takes input q, g, ga and returns (C, Y )
with Y = Ca, there exists an “extractor” Ā, which given the same inputs as A
returns c such that gc = C.
3.3 Cryptographic Primitives
We introduce several basic cryptographic primitives in this section.
3.3.1 Public Key Encryption
The goal of public key encryption (PKE) is to ensure the stored or transmitting
data be inaccessible to unauthorised parties. In PKE, all the users possess unique
public and private key pairs which are binding to their identities through a trusted
public key infrastructure (PKI). To send a message, the sender encrypts the message
with the recipient’s public key. In this way, only the user with knowledge of the
corresponding private key could recover the message.
A public key encryption scheme consists a tuple of PPT algorithms as follows:
• KeyGen: On input of a security parameter κ, the key generation algorithm
outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk) for a user.
• Encryption: On input of a message m and the recipient’s public key pk, the
encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c of m. The encryption algorithm
could either be a probabilistic or deterministic algorithm.
• Decryption: On input of the recipient’s private key and a ciphertext c, the
deterministic decryption algorithm outputs the plaintext m of c.
The security goals of encryption schemes is to achieve indistinguishability [GM84]
and non-malleability [DDN91]. The notation of indistinguishability (IND) is for-
malized by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] to capture the adversary’s inability in
obtaining any information about the plaintext given knowledge of the corresponding
ciphertext. While non-malleability (NM) is proposed by Dwork and Naor [DDN91]
in modelling the adversary’s inability when given a challenge ciphertext, to output
another ciphertext such that the corresponding plaintexts are meaningfully related.
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In cryptanalysis of cryptographic schemes, the capabilities of different adver-
saries are modelled by their abilities in querying different oracles. In public key en-
cryption, three different types of adversaries are considered, namely, chosen-plaintext
attack (CPA), non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1) and chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA2). A CPA adversary has access to the encryption oracle and can query
any plaintext of his choice to obtain the corresponding ciphertext. It is worth notic-
ing that the encryption oracle could be modelled by giving the public key suffices
to the adversary in public-key setting. Besides the public keys, a CCA1 adversary
[NY90] has access to a decryption oracle, to which he could query any ciphertext
of his choice and obtain the corresponding plaintext. In CCA1, the adversary has
access to the decryption oracle before his being given the challenge ciphertext. In
contrast, a CCA2 adversary [RS91] can query the decryption oracle after he obtains
the challenge ciphertext. The only restriction on a CCA2 adversary is that he should
not send the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle.Therefore, the security of
public key encryption schemes could be evaluated by six notions of security, namely,
IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2, NM-CPA, NM-CCA1, NM-CCA2 [BDPR98].
3.3.2 Digital Signature
Digital signature schemes provide vital secure properties like integrity, authentica-
tion and non-reputation, where integrity ensures that the data has not been modified
during transmission, authentication convinces that the data is indeed from a claimed
user while non-reputation implies the user can not deny at a later time his operation
on the data.
A digital signature scheme consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms as follows.
• KeyGen: On input of a security parameter κ, the key generation algorithm
outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk) for a user.
• Sign: On input of a message m and the user’s private key sk, the sign algorithm
outputs a signature σ of m. The sign algorithm could either be a probabilistic or
deterministic algorithm.
• Verity: On input of the user’s public key, a signature σ and m, the verify algo-
rithm outputs ‘1’ (accept) or ‘0’ (reject).
We introduce several attacks in digital signature schemes.
• Key-only attack. In this attack, the attacker only has access to the signer’s public
key.
• Known message attack. The adversary is given access to signatures for a list of
messages but these messages are not chosen by him.
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• Chosen message attack. In this attack, the adversary can choose a set of messages
and observe the corresponding signatures. However, the whole message list is
constructed before the adversary sees any signature.
• Adaptive chosen message attack. The adversary can observe the signature of
any message of his choice. Besides, he can requests signatures of messages which
depend on previous obtained signatures [GMR88].
We describe some security notions for digital signatures:
• Existential forgery. An adversary could forge a signature for at least one message,
while this message does not have to be of his choice (The adversary has no control
over the messages that he could obtain the signatures).
• Selective forgery. An adversary could forge a signature on a pre-chosen message.
• Universal forgery. The adversary can generate an acceptable signature on any
message without having the secret key.
• Total break. The adversary could calculate the signing key and totally break the
system.
In practice, EUF-CMA is the most common security notion for DS schemes. We
say a DS scheme is EUF-CMA secure if we can prove the DS scheme is existential
unforgeable under the adaptive chosen-message attack.
3.3.3 Proxy Signature
Proxy signature is a variant of digital signature that enables one signer named proxy
signer to generate signatures on behalf of another signer named original signer, while
the public could be convinced that a proxy signature is generated by a proxy signer
with proper delegation form an original signer.
A proxy signature scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter κ as input and returns the
public parameters params.
• KeyGen: The Key Generation algorithm takes the system parameters params as
input and outputs a user key pair (pk, sk). Let (skp, pkp) and (sko, pko) denote the
key pairs of the proxy signer and original signer generated through key generation
algorithm.
• DskGen: The delegation signing key generation algorithm takes the private key
sko of the original signer, public key pkp of the proxy signer and a warrant w
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including certain delegation information as input and outputs a delegation signing
key dsk for the proxy signer.
• PskGen: This algorithm takes the delegation signing key dsk from the original
signer and the private key skp of the proxy signer and outputs a proxy signing
key psk.
• ProSig: The proxy signing algorithm takes the proxy signing key psk and a
message m as input, and outputs a proxy signature σ.
• ProVer: The proxy signature verification algorithm takes the public keys pko and
pkp, a warrant w, a message m, and a proxy signature σ as input, and outputs
either ‘1’ or ‘0’.
There have been some work on defining security models of proxy signature [MOY04,
HSMW06, SMP08, BPW12]. Duo to [HSMW06], three different types of adversaries
should be taken into consideration in proxy signature.
• Outsider adversary. An outsider adversary only has access to the pubic keys of
the original signer and proxy signer.
• Malicious original signer. A malicious original signer has access to the public keys
of the proxy signers in addition to the private key of the original signer.
• Malicious proxy signer. A malicious proxy signer has access to the public keys of
the original signers and the private key of the proxy signer.
The security goal of proxy signature is the same as digital signature. The secu-
rity proof of a proxy signature scheme is to show the proxy signature scheme is
unforgeable with the above three type of adversaries.
3.3.4 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer protocol is an interactive protocol running between a sender and
a receiver such that the sender sends some information to the receiver while the
result remains oblivious to the sender. There are two participants in an OT system,
namely, a sender S and a receiver R. S possesses a set of messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}
and R makes a set of choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} such that σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤
i ≤ k. To be specific, an OT scheme can achieve the following properties:
1. The receiver can only obtain a fix number of messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk from
the message set {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} held by the sender where σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The receiver’s choice is hidden from the sender.
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2. The receiver cannot learn anything on message mi such that i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . ,
σk} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
An OT scheme is essentially an interactive protocol consisting of a tuple of PPT
algorithms as follows.
• Setup: Taking as input of a security parameter κ, the setup algorithm outputs
the system public parameters params.
• KeyGen: Taking as input of the public parameter params, the key generation
algorithm outputs a retrievable key pair (pk, sk) for a user.
• Commitment (optional): Taking as input of the system parameters params, the
messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn, the commitment algorithm outputs a set of ciphertext
c1, c2, . . . , cn.
• Request: Taking as input of the intended indexes σ, this algorithms outputs the
commitment of the user’s choice Aσ.
• Response: Taking as input of the commitment Aσ from the receiver, the secret
of the sender, the output of the algorithm is response of the sender.
• Extract: Taking as input of the response Dσ from the sender, the cipertext cα and
the system parameters params, output the message mσ of the receiver’s choice.
There have been some work [NP05, CNS07, KN09] on modelling security of OT
schemes. The half-simulation model, introduced by Naor and Pinkas has bee ap-
plied widely in evaluating the security of OT schemes. In this model, the security
of the sender and receiver is considered separately. The receiver’s privacy achieves
computational indistinguishability which means one choice σ of the receiver is indis-
tinguishable from another choice σ′ from the view of the sender. While the sender
security achieves a strong notion named simulatable security, which means any ma-
licious receiver R in the real world, we could build an ideal game with the help of a
trusted third party in which there is receiver R′ such that the outputs of R and R′
are indistinguishable.
3.3.5 Proof of Knowledge
A proof of knowledge system is an interactive proof system that allows one party,
usually called prover P , to convince another party, called verifier V , that the prover
knows some facts. Let x be an instance of a language L in NP and W (x) be
the set of witnesses for x that will be accepted in the proof. Define the relation
R = {(x,w) : x ∈ L,w ∈ W (x)}. Let φ : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1] be the knowledge error
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function. A proof of knowledge system for the relation R should satisfy the following
properties [BG92].
1. Completeness: The prover P who knows a witness w for x can convince the
verifier V of knowledge x with overwhelming probability.
Pr(P (x,w)↔ V (x)→ 1) = 1.
2. Proof of knowledge: If there exists a prover P̂ that has probability ε in
convincing V , then there exists a knowledge extractor E which given oracle
access to P̂ can extract a witness of x with probability at least ε− φ(x), i.e.,
Pr(w ← EP̂ (x)(x)) ≥ Pr(P̂ (x)↔ V (x)→ 1)− φ(x).
3.3.6 Hash Functions
Hash functions have been applied widely in constructing digital signature, message
authentication codes and key agreement/distribution protocols. A hash function
provides a short ‘fingerprint’ as a function of the data given to it. To be specific, a
hash function H : X→ Y has the following properties.
• Given x ∈ X, it is efficient to compute H(x).
• It is infeasible to find two inputs x, x′ ∈ X such that H(x) = H(x′).
In order to the primary properties of hash functions, cryptographic hash func-
tions have the following additional properties.
• Pre-image resistance: Given a hash function H : X → Y and y ∈ Y, there is
no efficient mechanism to find x ∈ X such that H(x) = y.
• Second pre-image resistance:Given a hash function H : X → Y and x ∈ X,
there is no efficient mechanism to find x′ ∈ X such that x 6= x′ and H(x) = H(x′).
• Collision resistance:Given a hash function H : X → Y, there is no efficient
mechanism to find x, x′ ∈ X such that x 6= x′ and H(x) = H(x′).
Hash functions with pre-image resistance and second pre-image resistance are re-
ferred to as One-Way Hash Functions (OWHF). Those with second pre-image resis-
tance and collision resistance are referred to as Collision Resistance Hash Functions
(CRHF) [Pre94].
Chapter 4
k-Time Proxy Signature
Proxy signature, which allows an original signer to delegate his/her signing right to
another party (or proxy signer), is very useful in many applications. Conventional
proxy signature only allows the original signer to specify in the warrant the validity
time period of the delegation but not the number of proxy signatures the proxy
signer can generate. To address this problem, we provide a formal treatment for
k-time proxy signature in this chapter. Such a scheme allows a designated proxy
signer to produce only a fixed number of proxy signatures on behalf of the original
signer. We provide the formal definitions and adversary models for k-time proxy
signature, and propose an efficient construction which is provably secure against
different types of adversaries. The original scheme was presented in ProSec 2013.
4.1 Introduction
One of the key issues in proxy signature is to ensure that a proxy signer will not
misuse the signing right obtained from an original signer. In the seminal work by
Mambo et al. [MUO96], a validity period is specified in a warrant in order to restrict
the signing capability of a proxy signer. This approach has been used in almost all
the following works on proxy signature. However, if the proxy signer is malicious,
even in a very short time, the malicious proxy signer can still produce as many
proxy signatures as he/she wishes. To address this problem, we provide a formal
and comprehensive treatment for k-time proxy signature where the proxy signer can
only generate a fixed number of proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer.
There have been a number of works (e.g., [BTT03, HKLL03, PWX04, KYC10])
on restricting the signing capability of a signer in normal digital signature schemes.
In [HKLL03], Hwang et al. proposed a multiple-time digital signature scheme, which
gives an upper bound on the number of signatures a signer can produce. Shortly
after that, Pieprzyk et al. [PWX04] proposed a more general multiple-time signature
scheme based on one-way functions and cover-free families. Kim et al. [KYC10]
then extended multiple-time signature to a new primitive named metered signature,
which allows a signer to produce a fixed number of signatures in a designated time
period.
However, a formal and complete treatment for multi-time (or k-time) proxy
signature is still missing. In [MH05], Mehta and Harn proposed a one-time proxy
signature scheme, which is less useful than a more general k-time proxy signature
24
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scheme. There is a multi-time proxy signature scheme presented in [CKK03], how-
ever, no formal security model or proof has been provided. In [HC09], Hong and
Chen presented a multiple-time proxy signature scheme based on a binary hash tree.
However, their security analysis is incomplete since it does not cover all the possible
attacks against a multiple-time proxy signature scheme.
Our Contributions. In this chapter, we provide a formal and complete treat-
ment for multi-time (or k-time) proxy signature schemes. We first provide a formal
security model for such schemes. In our model, we will consider three types of ad-
versaries, namely outsiders, proxy signer, and original signer. Our model aims to
capture the exact security goal of a k-time proxy signature scheme, that is only a
proxy signer, who has been delegated the signing right from an original signer, can
produce at most k valid proxy signatures. We then propose a new k-time proxy sig-
nature scheme based on the Schnorr signature scheme and verifiable secret sharing.
In our scheme, the original signer can specify in the warrant the number of proxy
signatures a proxy signer can produce. If the proxy signer produces more than pre-
determined number of proxy signatures, his/her private key can be computed by
the public. That means the original signer does not need to monitor the behavior
of the proxy signer. It is worth noting that such a feature is not supported in Hong
and Chen’s scheme [HC09]. In their scheme, the proxy signer’s private key can only
be computed by the original signer rather than by any third party verifier when the
proxy signer misbehaves.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We introduce the definition of k-time proxy signature in Section 4.2. A formal
security model for k-time proxy signature is presented in Section 4.3. We then give
our new proxy signature scheme in Section 4.4 and prove its security in Section 4.5.
This chapter is concluded in Section 4.6.
4.2 Formal Definition
A k-time (or multi-time) proxy signature scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms
(ST ,KG,DSK PKG,PS,PV ,R):
• Setup–(ST ): This algorithm takes 1κ as input where κ is a security parameter
and returns the public parameters params.
• KeyGen–(KG): The Key Generation algorithm takes params as input and outputs
a user key pair (pk, sk).
• DskGen–(DKG): This algorithm takes (sko, pko, pkp,mw) as input and outputs a
delegation key dsk. Here mw denotes a warrant which specifies the predetermined
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number of proxy signatures that can be generated by the proxy signer.
• PskGen–(PKG): This algorithm takes dsk and skp as input and outputs a proxy
signing key psk.
• ProSig–(PS): The proxy signing algorithm takes the proxy signing key psk and
a message m in the message space M as input, and outputs a proxy signature σ.
• ProVer–(PV): The proxy signature verification algorithm takes the public keys
pko and pkp, a warrant mw, a message m, and a proxy signature σ as input, and
outputs either 1 or 0.
• Reveal–(R): Given pko, pkp, a warrant mw, and k+1 different message and proxy
signature pairs, where k is the number specified in the warrant mw, this algorithm
either outputs a private key skp of the proxy signer or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
Correctness. We require that for any message space M ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and any security
parameter κ ∈ N, if params ← ST (1κ), (sko, pko) ← KG(params), (skp, pkp) ←
KG(params), dsk ← DKG(sko, pko, pkp,mw), psk ← PKG(dsk, skp), then
PV(pko, pkp,mw,m,PS(psk,m)) = 1.
4.3 Security Model
In a k-time proxy signature scheme, the security consideration is different from
that for the traditional proxy signature [YMS+12] or k-time signature [HKLL03].
According to the definition, the security of a k-time proxy signature should be
defined in three aspects, which are summarized below.
1. Type I: the Type I attacker AI (an outsider) possesses the public keys of the
original signer and the proxy signer, and tries to forge a proxy signature.
2. Type II: the Type II attacker AII (proxy signer) possesses the public keys of
the original signer and the proxy signer. In addition, he also possesses the
private key skp. We can further divide AII into AII1 and AII2. AII1 tries to
forge a valid proxy signature without obtaining delegation from the original
signer, and AII2 has a valid delegation from the original signer and tries to
produce more than predetermined number of proxy signatures.
3. Type III: the Type III attacker AIII (the original signer) possesses the public
keys of the original signer and the proxy signer. In addition, he has the private
key sko of the original signer. AIII tries to forge a valid proxy signature without
knowing the private key skp of the proxy signer.
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It is obvious that if a k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against AII and
AIII , it is also secure against AI . So we will only focus on the adversarial models
with regards to AII and AIII in the rest of this chapter.
Before we formally define each adversarial model, we first introduce two types
of queries that may appear in the models:
• Delegation query: A can query the delegation oracle ODKG(sko, pko, pkp, ·) with
any warrant mw. The corresponding delegation key dsk is then generated and
returned to A.
• Proxy signing query: A can query the proxy signing oracle OPS(psk, ·) with any
message m of his choice. A valid proxy signature on m is generated and returned
to A.
Type II1 Adversary
We define the adversarial game between a Type II1 adversary AII1 and an simulator
S as follows:
• Setup: The Simulator S runs ST to generate public parameters params.
• KeyGen The Simulator S runs KG to generate the key pairs of the original signer
(sko, pko) and a proxy signer (skp, pkp). S sends pko, pkp and skp to the adversary
AII1.
• Delegation queries: AII1 chooses any warrant mw of his/her choice and queries
the delegation oracle ODKG. S generates the delegation key dsk ← DKG(sko, pko,
pkp,mw) and returns dsk to AII1.
• Proxy signing queries: AII1 chooses a warrant mw and a message m, and
queries the proxy signing oracle OPS. If mw has appeared in a Delegation Query, a
special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to A. Otherwise, S generates dsk ← DKG(sko, pko,
pkp,mw), psk ← PKG(dsk, skp), σ ← PS(psk,m), and returns σ to AII1.
• Finally, AII1 outputs (m∗w,m∗, σ∗). We say AII1 wins the game if
– PV(pko, pkp,m∗w,m∗, σ∗) = 1;
– AII1 did not make a query to ODKG on m∗w;
– AII1 did not make a query to OPS on (m∗w,m∗).
Define the advantage of a Type II1 adversary as
AdvcwcmaAII1 (κ) = Pr[AII1 Wins the game].
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Definition 4.1. We say a k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the Type
II1 chosen warrant and chosen message attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial
time AII1, AdvcwcmaAII1 (κ) is negligible in κ.
Type II2 Adversary
We define the adversarial game between a Type II2 adversary AII2 and an simulator
S as follows:
• Setup: The Simulator S runs ST to generate public parameters params.
• KeyGen The Simulator S runs KG to generate the key pairs of an original signer
(sko, pko) and a proxy signer (skp, pkp). S sends pko, pkp and skp to the adversary
AII2.
• Delegation queries: AII2 chooses any warrant mw of his/her choice and queries
the delegation oracle ODKG. S generates the delegation key dsk ← DKG(sko, pko,
pkp,mw) and returns dsk to AII2.
• Finally, AII2 outputs a warrant mw which contains a predetermined number k,
and k + 1 message-signature pairs (mi, σi) (1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1) where mi 6= mj for
i 6= j. We say AII2 wins the game if
– PV(pko, pkp,mw,mi, σi) = 1 for all i ∈ [1, k + 1];
– R(pko, pkp,mw, (m1, σ1), · · · , (mk+1, σk+1)) = ⊥.
Define the advantage of a Type II2 adversary as
AdvcwaAII2(κ) = Pr[AII2 Wins the game].
Definition 4.2. We say a k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the Type
II2 chosen warrant attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time AII2, AdvcwaAII2(κ)
is negligible in κ.
Type III Adversary
The adversarial game between a Type III adversary AIII and an simulator S is
defined as follows:
• Setup: The Simulator S runs S to generate public parameters params and gives
params to the adversary.
• KeyGen The Simulator S runs KG to generate the key pairs of the original signer
(sko, pko) and a proxy signer (skp, pkp). S sends sko, pko and pkp to the adversary
AIII .
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• Proxy signing queries: AIII queries the proxy signing oracle OPS by providing
a warrant mw generated according to the scheme, a valid delegation key dsk for
mw, and a message m. S generates psk ← PKG(dsk, skp), σ ← PS(psk,m), and
returns σ to AIII .
• Finally, AIII outputs (m∗w,m∗, σ∗). We say AIII wins the game if
– PV(pko, pkp,m∗w,m∗, σ∗) = 1;
– For any warrant mw with a predetermined number k, AIII makes at most k
proxy signing queries;
– AIII did not make a query to OPS on (m∗w,m∗).
Define the advantage of a Type III adversary as
AdvcmaAIII (κ) = Pr[AIII Wins the game].
Definition 4.3. We say a k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the Type
III chosen message attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time AIII , AdvcmaAIII (κ)
is negligible in κ.
4.4 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present a new k-time proxy signature scheme based on the Schnorr
signature [Sch89] and secret sharing. Our k-time proxy signature scheme works as
follows:
1. ST : given a security parameter κ ∈ N, generate the parameters params =
(G, g, q) such that |q| = κ and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
2. KG: randomly choose x ∈ Zq and compute y = gx. Output (sk, pk) = (x, y).
3. DKG: given a warrant mw = (k,B = {b1, b2, · · · , bk})a, where k is a number
selected by the original signer and bi = g
ai (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are generated by the
proxy signer and sent to the original singer via a secure channel, the original
signer first chooses a random number ko ∈ Zq, and then computes Ko = gko ,
σo = sko · h(mw‖Ko) + ko mod q. The original signer then sets dsk = (Ko, σo)
as the delegation key for mw.
4. PKG: given a delegation key dsk = (Ko, σo) for a warrant mw, the proxy
signer computes Sp = σo + skp mod q and outputs the proxy signing key
psk = (Ko, Sp, skp).
aIt is worth noting that we can put additional information, such as the validity time period and
the type of message the proxy signer is allowed to sign, in the warrant.
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5. PS: given a message m to be signed, and a proxy signing key psk = (Ko, Sp,
skp), the proxy signer chooses a random number kp ∈ Zq, and computes Kp =
gkp and σp = Sp · h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp) + kp mod q. The proxy signer also
computes f(ω) = skp+a1ω+a2ω
2 + ...+akω
k mod q where ω = h(mw,m, σp).
The proxy signature is σ = (Ko, Kp, σp, f(ω)).
6. PV : given public keys pko and pkp, a warrant mw = (k,B = {b1, b2, · · · , bk}),
a message m and a proxy signature σ = (Ko, Kp, σp, f(ω)), the verifier checks
if the following equation holds
• gσp = Kp · (pkp ·Ko · pkh(mw‖Ko)o )h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp);
• gf(ω) = pkp · bω1 · bω
2
2 · · · bω
k
k .
If both equations hold, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
7. R: given pko, pkp,mw = (k,B = {b1, b2, · · · , bk}), and k+ 1 message signature
pairs (mi, σi), solve the following equations
f(ω1) = skp + a1ω1 + a2ω
2
1 + ...+ akω
k
1
f(ω2) = skp + a1ω2 + a2ω
2
2 + ...+ akω
k
2
· · ·
f(ωk+1) = skp + a1ωk+1 + a2ω
2
k+1 + ...+ akω
k
k+1
for variables (skp, a1, · · · , ak). If a solution is found, output skp, otherwise,
output ‘⊥’.
The correctness of the scheme can be verified as follows
gσp = gSp·h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp)+kp
= (gσo+skp)h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp) · gkp
= (gsko·h(mw‖Ko)+ko · gskp)h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp) ·Kp
= (pkh(mw‖Ko)o ·Ko · pkp)h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp) ·Kp
gf(ω) = gskp+a1ω+a2ω
2+...+akω
k
= pkp · (ga1)ω · (ga2)ω
2 · · · (gak)ωk
= pkp · bω1 · bω
2
2 · · · bω
k
k
4.5 Security Analysis
In this section we analyse the security of the above k-time proxy signature scheme
against AII and AIII adversaries.
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Theorem 4.1. The proposed k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the
Type II1 chosen warrant and chosen message attacks if the Discrete Logarithm
Problem is hard.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Given an adversary AII1 that can win the
Type II1 game, we construct another algorithm B that can solve the DLP.
Given (g, y∗ = gx
∗
) for some unknown x∗ ∈ Zq, B simulates the Type II1 game
for AII1 as follows. B sets the original signer’s public key as pko = y∗ and maintains
a H-table to record all the hash queries and the corresponding answers.
Hash queries: For each hash query with an input message msg, B first checks the
H-table:
• If there exists an item (msg, h) in the H-table,where msg refers to the messages
queried before, B returns h as the answer to AII1.
• Otherwise, B chooses a random h ∈ Zq, sends h to AII1 as the answer for the
hash query, and adds (msg, h) into the H-table.
Delegation queries: When AII1 makes a delegation query on a warrant mw =
(k,B = (b1, b2, · · · , bk)), B answers the query as follows.
• Choose randomly ho, σo ∈ Zq, compute Ko = gσo/pkhoo , and set h(mw‖Ko) = ho
by adding (mw‖Ko, ho) into the H-table.
• Return (Ko, σo) as the delegation key to AII1.
Proxy signing queries: When AII1 makes a proxy signing query on a warrant
mw = (k,B = (b1, b2, · · · , bk)), and a message m, B responds the query as follows:
• Generate a delegation key dsk = (Ko, σo) for the warrant mw by applying the
same approach as described in answering delegation queries.
• Use the derived dsk and skp to produce the proxy signing key psk by running the
PKG algorithm, and then use psk to generate the proxy signature for message m
by running the PS algorithm.
Assume AII1 can forge a valid proxy signature σ∗ = (K∗o , K∗p , σ∗p, f(ω∗)) for a
warrant m∗w and a message m
∗ such that
gσ
∗
p = K∗p · (pkp ·K∗o · pkh(m
∗
w‖K∗o )
o )
h(h(m∗w‖K∗o )‖m∗‖K∗p ).
Then according to the Forking Lemma [PS96], by rewinding the adversary and
providing a new hash value for h(m∗w‖K∗o )‖m∗‖K∗p , B can obtain S∗p = σ∗o +skp mod
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q and σ∗o = S
∗
p − skp mod q which satisfies
gσ
∗
o = K∗o · pkh
∗
o
where h∗ = h(m∗w‖K∗o ).
After that, B repeats the above simulation for AII1 except that a new value ĥ∗
is chosen as the hash value for m∗w‖K∗o . Again, due to the Forking Lemma [PS96],
B can obtain a new σ̂∗o which satisfies
gσ̂
∗
o = K∗o · pkĥ
∗
o .
B can then compute x∗ = sko = (σ∗o − σ̂∗o)/(h∗ − ĥ∗) and solve the Discrete
Logarithm Problem. This completes the proof for Theorem 1.
Theorem 4.2. The proposed k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the
Type II2 chosen warrant attacks.
Proof. According to our scheme, if a signature σ = (Ko, Kp, σp, f(ω)) is valid with
regards to a warrant mw = (k,B = (b1, b2, · · · , bk)) and message m , then
gf(ω) = pkp · b1ω · b2ω
2 · · · bkω
k
.
Suppose an adversary AII2 have produced k + 1 proxy signatures with regards
to a warrant mw and different messages {m1,m2, · · · ,mk+1}, then we have
f(ω1) = skp + a1ω1 + a2ω
2
1 + ...+ akω
k
1
f(ω2) = skp + a1ω2 + a2ω
2
2 + ...+ akω
k
2
...
f(ωk+1) = skp + a1ωk+1 + a2ω
2
k+1 + ...+ akω
k
k+1
where ωi = h(mw,mi, σpi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. Since the hash function is mod-
elled as a random oracle, each ωi is a random element in Zq. Therefore, with
overwhelming probability, the reveal algorithm R can recover the unique solution
(skp, a1, a2, · · · , ak) that satisfies the above equations.
Theorem 4.3. The proposed k-time proxy signature scheme is secure against the
Type III chosen message attacks if the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 1, that is, if there exists an
adversaryAIII which can win the Type III game, we can construct another algorithm
B which can solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
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Given (g, y∗ = gx
∗
) where x∗ ∈ Zq is randomly chosen from Zq, B simulates the
Type III game for AIII as follows. B generates sko, pko and sets the proxy signer’s
public key as pkp = y
∗. B answers hash queries by maintaining a H-table as in the
proof of Theorem 1.
When a new warrant mw with a predetermined number k is to be created, B
generates the values ofB = (b1, b2, · · · , bk) as follows. B randomly chooses ωi, si ∈ Zq
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then based on the result in [Ped91], B can calculate bi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) ∈ G
that satisfies gsi = y∗ ·
∏k
j=1 b
ωji
j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. B saves the values of {ωi, si}1≤i≤k
with regards to mw for later use.
Proxy signing queries: To answer the `-th (1 ≤ ` ≤ k) proxy signing query on a
warrant mw, B first finds out the values of (ω`, s`) that have been computed when
generating the warrant mw. B then computes the proxy signature as follows:
• Randomly choose σp, τ ∈ Zq;
• Compute Kp = gσp/(pkp ·Ko · pkh(mw‖Ko)o )τ ;
• Set h(h(mw‖Ko)‖m‖Kp) = τ ;
• Set h(mw‖m‖σp) = ω`;
• Return σ = (Ko, Kp, σp, s`).
It is easy to verify that σ can successfully pass the signature verification.
Suppose AIII outputs a forgery (m∗w,m∗, σ∗ = (K∗o , K∗p , σ∗p, s∗)) which satisfies
gσ
∗
p = K∗p · (y∗ ·K∗o · pkh(m
∗
w‖K∗o )
o )
h(h(m∗w‖K∗o )‖m∗‖K∗p )
where dsk∗ = (K∗o , σ
∗
o) is the delegation key provided by AIII for the warrant m∗w.
According to the Forking Lemma, by rewinding AIII and providing a new hash value
of h(h(m∗w‖K∗o )‖m∗‖K∗p), B can obtain another valid signature σ̂∗ = (K∗o , K∗p , σ̂∗p, ŝ∗))
for (m∗w,m
∗). Then B can derive
S∗p = (σ
∗
p − σ̂∗p)/(h∗ − ĥ∗) mod q
where h∗ and ĥ∗ are the hash values for h(m∗w‖K∗o )‖m∗‖K∗p in the two executions.
Finally, B can compute x∗ = S∗p − σ∗o mod q and solve the DLP.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a formal security model and an efficient construction
of k-time proxy signature scheme. Our model has considered different types of
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potential adversaries against a k-time proxy signature scheme, and is to date the
first complete formal security model for such schemes. We then presented a practical
k-time proxy signature scheme based on the Schnorr signature and verifiable secret
sharing. One interesting feature of our scheme is that the proxy signer’s secret key
can be discovered by the public if the proxy signer misbehaves. We also provided
formal security proofs to demonstrate that the proposed scheme is provably secure in
the proposed security model. We leave the problem of constructing a secure k-time
proxy signature scheme without random oracles as our future work.
Chapter 5
Attribute-Based Signing Right Del-
egation
Attribute-based signature and proxy signature are both very useful in many real-
world applications. In this chapter, we present an attribute-based proxy signature
scheme benefiting from both proxy signature and attribute-based signature. In the
proposed scheme, an original signer, who possesses a set of attributes, can delegate
his/her signing right to a designated proxy signer. By verifying the signature, a
verifier can be convinced that the signature is generated by the proxy signer who
has obtained the delegation from a legitimate signer whose attributes satisfy a pred-
icate. However, the verifier cannot tell from the signature who is the original signer.
We provide the formal definition and adversarial models for attribute-based proxy
signature, and an efficient scheme that supports threshold predicates. The original
scheme was presented in NSS 2014.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are interested in signing right delegation under the attribute-
based setting environment. The proposed scheme can be regarded as a variant of
attribute-based proxy signature schemes(ABPS). ABPS has many potential appli-
cations, for example, attribute-based authentication [MPR11]. Consider a database
whose access control is described in a policy such that only users who hold autho-
rised attribute keys can access it. An authorised user can delegate his/her signing
rights to another user so that the latter can also access the database and collect
information when the former is not available. The delegated signer is called a proxy
of the original authorised signer. In our proposed scheme, the verifier can be con-
vinced that a valid proxy signer holds the right delegation from an original signer
and therefore can access the database. The attributed based proxy signature can
be regarded as a certificate for accessing the database. We noticed that a paper
regarding attribute-based proxy signature has recently been proposed in [LMX+13].
However, the adversarial models in [LMX+13] are not properly defined. In addition,
the application scenario is different from ours.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
The formal definition and security model of ABPS are presented in Section 5.2 and
Section 5.3 separately. We then present our ABPS scheme in Section 5.4 and prove
35
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its security in Section 5.5. This chapter is concluded in Section 5.6.
5.2 Formal Definition
An attribute-based proxy signature scheme is parameterized by a universe of possible
attributes A , a warrant space Mω, and a message space M. It consists of the
following algorithms.
• ABPS.Setup: takes a security parameter 1κ as input and outputs the public
parameters params and a master secret key MSK for the central authority.
• ABPS.KeyGen: takes params as input and outputs a proxy key pair (pk, sk).
• ABPS.AttrKeyGen: takes (MSK, params, ω) as input where ω ⊆ A is the
attribute set of a user and outputs an attribute key skω.
• ABPS.DskGen: takes (skω,mw ∈ Mw,Υ) as input, where mw is a warrant
specified by the original signer, Υ is a predicate such that there exists ω′ ⊆ ω
which satisfies Υ(ω′) = 1, and outputs a delegation key dsk.
• ABPS.ProSig: takes (dsk, sk,m ∈ M) as input, and outputs a proxy signature
σ.
• ABPS.ProVer: takes (Υ, pk,mw,m, σ) as input, and outputs 1 (‘accept’) or 0
(‘reject’).
Correctness: We require that for any warrant and message spaces Mw,M ⊆ {0, 1}∗
and any security parameter κ ∈ N, if
(params,MSK)← ABPS.Setup(1κ),
(pk, sk)← ABPS.KeyGen(params),
skω ← ABPS.AttrenKenGen(MSK, params, ω),
dsk ← ABPS.DskGen(skω,mw,Υ),
then
ABPS.ProVer(Υ, pk,mw,m,ABPS.ProSig(dsk, sk,m)) = 1.
5.3 Security Model
In an attribute-based proxy signature scheme, the security consideration is different
from that for a traditional proxy signature or attribute-based signature. According
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to the definition of attribute-based proxy signature, we consider three different types
of adversaries:
1. AI : an outsider attacker who only has the universe of attributes A and the
public key pkp of the proxy signer and tries to forge a valid proxy signature σ.
2. AII : a malicious proxy signer that possesses the private key skp and a valid
warrant mw from the original signer, and tries to forge a valid proxy signature
σ for another warrant m∗w.
3. AIII : a malicious original signer that possesses the attribute key skω and the
public key pkp of the proxy signer, and tries to forge a valid proxy signature
σ without knowing the private key skp of the proxy signer.
It is obvious that if an attribute-based proxy signature scheme is secure under AII
or AIII , it is also secure against AI . Thus we will only focus on the adversarial
models with regards to AII and AIII in the rest of this chapter. Before we formally
define each adversarial model, we first introduce three types of oracle queries that
will appear in the models:
• Attribute Key Generation Query: A can query the attribute key for an
attribute set ω ⊆ A of his choice to the attribute key generation oracle OAKG(·).
The corresponding attribute key skω is then generated and returned to A.
• Delegation Query: A can query the delegation oracle ODKG(skω, ·, ·) with any
warrant mw and access structure Υ of his choice. The corresponding delegation
key dsk is generated and returned to A.
• Proxy Signing Query: A can query the proxy signing oracle OPS(dsk, skp, ·)
with any message m of his choice. A valid proxy signature on m is generated and
returned to A.
We define the selective adversarial game between a malicious proxy signer AII
and a simulator S as follows:
• Initial Phase: AII chooses and outputs a challenge predicate Υ∗ that will be
used in forging a proxy signature.
• ABPS.Setup Phase: The simulator S runs ABPS.Setup to generate the
params and MSK, and sends params to AII .
• ABPS.KeyGen Phase: The simulator S also runs the ABPS.KeyGen to
generate the key pairs (pkp, skp) of the proxy signer, and sends (pkp, skp) to AII .
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• Attribute Key Generation Queries: AII selects an attribute set ω ∈ A, the
simulator S runs skω ← ABPS.AttrKeyGen(MSK, params, ω) and returns
skω to AII .
• Delegation Queries Phase: AII chooses any predicate Υ such that Υ 6= Υ∗
and any warrant mw of his choice and queries the delegation oracle ODKG. S
generates the delegation key dsk ← ABPS.DskGen(skω,Υ,mw) and sends dsk
to A.
• Proxy Signing Queries Phase: AII chooses a warrantmw ∈MW and a message
m ∈ M and queries the proxy signing oracle OPS. If mw has appeared in a
Delegation Query, a special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to AII . Otherwise, S generates
dsk ← ABPS.DskGen(skω,Υ,mw),
σ ← ABPS.ProSign(dsk, skp,mw,m)
and returns σ to AII .
• Forgery Phase: Finally, A outputs a proxy signature σ∗ on message m∗ for a
warrant m∗w and the predicate Υ
∗.
We say AII wins the game if
• ABPS.ProVer(Υ∗, pkp,m∗w,m∗, σ∗) = 1;
• (m∗w,Υ∗) has not been queried to ODSK ;
• Attribute sets ω∗ satisfying Υ∗(ω∗) = 1 have not been submitted to the attribute
key generation oracle OAKG.
Define the advantage of a malicious adversary AII in winning the game as
AdvspcwcmaAII (κ) = Pr[AII Wins the game].
Definition 5.1. We say an attribute-based proxy signature scheme is secure against
the AII under the selective-predicate and chosen warrant and message attacks if for
any probabilistic polynomial time AII , AdvspcwcmaAII (κ) is negligible in κ.
The adversarial game between a malicious original signer AIII and a simulator
S is defined as follows:
• ABPS.Setup Phase: The simulator S runs the ABPS.Setup to generate the
params and MSK, and sends params and MSK to AIII .
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• ABPS.KeyGen Phase: The simulator generates
(pkp, skp)← ABPS.KeyGen
and sends pkp to AIII .
• Proxy Signing Queries Phase: AIII queries the proxy signing oracle OPS
by providing a warrant mw, a valid delegation key dsk for mw, and a mes-
sage m of his choice. The simulator S generates the proxy signature σ ←
ABPS.ProSign(dsk, skp,mw,m) and returns σ to AIII .
• Forgery Phase: Finally, AIII outputs a proxy signature σ∗ on message m∗ for
a warrant m∗w and predicate Υ
∗.
We say AIII wins the game if
• ABPS.PorVer(Υ∗, pkp,m∗w,m∗, σ∗) = 1;
• (m∗w,m∗) has not been queried to OPS;
Define the advantage of a malicious adversary AIII in winning the game as
AdvcmaAIII (κ) = Pr[AIII Wins the game].
Definition 5.2. We say an attribute-based proxy signature scheme is secure against
the AIII under chosen message attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time AIII ,
AdvcmaAIII (κ) is negligible in κ.
5.4 Proposed Scheme
In our system, the original signer holds a set of attributes and delegates his signing
rights to a proxy signer with a normal public/private key pair.
1. ABPS.Setup: First, define the universe of attributes U as elements in Zp.
Let the d− 1 default set of attributes from Zp which has no intersection with
U be Ω = {Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ωd−1} and let ω∗ be another default attribute set with
ω∗ ⊆ U . Select a random generator g ∈R G1 and a random number x ∈ Z∗p,
set g1 = g
x. Pick random elements g2 and compute Z = e(g1, g2). Select a
collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The public parameters are
params = (g, g1, g2, Z,H). The master secret key is MSK = x.
2. ABPS.KeyGen: The user selects one random number xp ∈R Z∗p and set the
private and public key pair as (skp, pkp) = (xp, g
xp).
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3. ABPS.AttrKeyGen: To generate a private key for an attribute set ω, pro-
ceed as follows:
• Choose a d− 1 polynomial q such that q(0) = x;
• Generate a new set of attribute ω̂ = ω ∪Ω. For each i ∈ ω̂, choose ri ∈R Zp
and compute di0 = g
q(i)
2 ·H(attri)ri and di1 = gri ;
• The private key Di = {(di0, di1)}, i ∈ ω̂.
4. ABPS.DskGen: Given a warrant mw, the original signer selects a k-element
subset ω′ ⊆ ω ∩ ω∗ and the delegation signing key is generated as follows:
• The original signer selects a default attribute subset Ω′ ⊆ Ω with |Ω′| = d−k,
chooses n+ d− k random values r′i ∈ Zp, where i ∈ ω∗ ∪ Ω′;
• The original signer chooses a random value s ∈ Zp and computes σ0 =∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ d
∆i,S(0)
i0
∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ H(attri)
r′iH(mw)
s, {σi = d
∆i,S(0)
i1 g
r′i}i∈ω′∪Ω′ , {σi =
gr
′
i}ω∗/ω′ , σ′0 = gs;
• The delegation signing key is dsk = (σ0, {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ , σ′0).
5. ABPS.ProSign: Given dsk, skp and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗. The proxy
signature σM = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3) is generated as follows:
• Compute σM1 = σ0 ·H(m)skp , σM2 = {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ , σM3 = σ′0.
6. ABPS.Verification: Given σM = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3), mw and Υk,ω∗ , the verifier
first check whether the proxy signer follow the rules specified in the warrant.
If no, output reject, otherwise, the verifier checks the following equation:
e(g, σM1)∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)e(H(mw), σM3)e(pkp, H(m))
?
= Z.
If the equation holds, output accept, where it can be assured that the signature
is generated form some user possessing k attributes among ω∗, otherwise,
output reject.
• Correctness: The correctness of the verification is justified by the following
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equations:
e(g, σM1)∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)e(H(mw), σM3)e(pkp, H(m))
=
e(g, σ0 ·H(m)skp)∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)e(H(mw), σM3)e(pkp, H(m))
=
e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ d
∆i,S(0)
i0
∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ H(attri)
r′iH(mw)
s ·H(m)skp)∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)e(H(mw), σM3)e(pkp, H(m))
=
e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ d
∆i,S(0)
i0 )e(g,
∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ H(attri)
r′i)e(H(mw), g
s)e(pkp, H(m))∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)e(H(mw), σM3)e(pkp, H(m))
=
e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ d
∆i,S(0)
i0 )e(g,
∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ H(attri)
r′i)∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω′ e(H(attri), σi)
=
e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ g
q(i)·∆i,S(0)
2 )e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ H(attri)
ri·∆i,S(0)+r′i)e(g,
∏
i∈ω∗/ω′ H(attri)
r′i)
e(g,
∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ H(attri)
ri·∆i,S(0)+r′i)e(g,
∏
i∈ω∗/ω′ H(attri)
r′i)
= e(g, g
q(0)
2 )
= e(g, gx2 )
= e(gx, g2)
= Z.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section we analyse the security of the above attribute-based proxy signature
scheme against AII and AIII adversaries.
Theorem 5.1. Our attribute-based proxy signature scheme is secure against the AII
chosen warrant and chosen message attacks if the CDH Problem is hard.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction in the selective predicate security model. Sup-
pose that an adversary AII has an advantage ε in attacking the proposed scheme,
then we can build an algorithm B that use AII to solve the CDH problem. Let G1
be a bilinear pairing group of prime order p, B is given g, gα, gβ ∈ G1 which is a
random instance of the CDH problem. Its goal is to compute gαβ. Algorithm B will
simulate the challenger and interact with the forger AII as described below, let’s
recall the definition of AII , AII is a malicious proxy signer possessing the private
key of the proxy signer. With this in mind, the simulation is as follows:
1. Initial Phase: AII chooses a predicate Υ∗k,ω∗ as the challenge predicate.
2. Setup: Let the default attribute set Ω be {Ω1, . . . ,Ωd−1}. B sets g1 = gα, g2 =
gβ, where gα, gβ are inputs of the CDH problem. B sets the public parameters
as:
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• B chooses random xp ∈R Z∗p and sets skp = xp, pkp = gxp .
• B sends (G1, G2, e, p, g, g1, g2, H) and (skp, pkp) to AII .
3. Hash queries: In order to make the simulation easy to follow, we regard the
attribute, warrant and message queries as H1,H2 and H3 queries respectively.
Assume B keeps hash tables T1, T2 and T3 for the queries.
(a) H1 Query: Assume AII makes qH1 attribute queries, for each query on
attribute attri, B simulates as follows:
• If attri have existed in T1, a same value H(attri) is returned to AII .
• Otherwise,
– If attri ∈ ω∗∪Ω∗, B chooses random ai ∈ Zp and returns H(attri) =
gai to AII . B adds (attri, H(attri)) to T1.
– If attri /∈ ω∗∪Ω∗, B chooses random ai, bi ∈ Zp and returnsH(attri) =
g−aigbi to AII . B adds (attri, H(attri)) to T1.
(b) H2 Query: Assume AII makes qH2 warrant queries, B selects a random
number δ ∈ (0, qH2), for each query on warrant mwi , B simulates as
follows:
• If mwi have existed in T2, a same value H(mwi) is returned to AII .
• Otherwise,
– If i 6= δ, B chooses random a′i, b′i ∈r Zp and returns H(mwi) = g
b′i
1 g
a′i .
B adds (mwi , H(mwi)) to T2.
– If i = δ, B chooses random b′i and returns H(wi) = ga
′
i . B adds
(mwi , H(mwi)) to T2
(c) H3 Query: Assume AII makes qH3 message queries, for each query on
message mi, B simulates as follows:
• If mi has existed in T3, a same value H(mi) is returned to AII .
• Otherwise, B chooses random ri ∈R Zp and returns H(mi) = gri . B
adds (mi, H(mi)) to T3.
4. Attribute key extraction queries: Assume AII issues an attribute key
extraction query on an attribute set ω such that |ω∗ ∩ ω| < k. Following the
analysis in [LAS+10], we first define three sets Γ,Γ′, S in the following manner:
Γ = (ω ∩ ω∗) ∪ Ω∗ and Γ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ S with |Γ′| = d − 1. Let S = Γ′ ∪ {0}. The
simulation on the attribute key Di is as follows:
• For i ∈ Γ′: Di = (gτi2 H(attri)ri , gri), where τi, ri ∈R Zp.
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• For i 6∈ Γ′, Di could be simulated as:
Di = (g
∆0,S(i)bi
ai
+
∑
j∈Γ′ ∆j,S(i)q(j)
2 )(g
−ai
1 g
bi)r
′
i , g
∆0,S(i)
ai
2 g
r′i),
where r′i ∈R Zp. It is a correct key because it implicitly sets
ri =
∆j,S(i)q(j)
ai
β + r′i.
As we know,
q(i) =
∑
j∈Γ′
∆j,S(i)q(j) + ∆0,S(i)q(0),
thus we have,
g
q(i)
2 H(attri)
ri = g
∆0,S(i)bi
ai
+
∑
j∈Γ′ ∆j,S(i)q(j)
2 H(attri)
r′i
and
gri = g
∆0,S(i)
ai
2 g
r′i .
5. Delegation signing key queries: AII can also issue a query for a warrant
W for an attribute set ω with k′ values out of an n′-value attribute set ω. The
delegation signing key query could be simulated as follows:
• If |ω ∪ ω∗| < k, B can generate a simulated private key for ω as in the
attribute key simulation and get a signature for ω on W normally.
• If |ω ∩ ω∗| > k, B selects a random (d − k′)-element subset Ω′ from Ω. If
H(W ) 6= gai , in order to simulate (gx2
∏
i∈ω∪Ω′ H(attri)
riH(w)ra ,
{gri}i∈ω∪Ω′ , gra)
– Choose r′a ∈ Zp and set r′a = 1cβ + ra. Then
gx2
∏
i∈ω∪Ω′
H(attri)
riH(w)ra = (gc1g
ai)r
′
a
∏
i∈ω∪Ω′
H(attri)
rig
−ai
c
2 ,
gra = g
−1
c
2 g
r′a
when H(W ) = gc1g
ai .
6. Proxy signing queries: Assume AII makes qps proxy signing queries. If AII
issues a proxy signature queries for a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ under a warrant
W for a predicate Υ, in order to simulate σ = σ0 · H(m)skp , B generates the
delegation signing key σ0 as in the delegation signing queries and answers
the proxy signing queries as follows:
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• If mi has existed in T3, then return σ = σ0 · pkrip as the proxy signature to
AII , where H(mi) = gri exists in T3.
• If mi does not appear in T3, then choose random ri ∈ Zp and return σ =
σ0 · pkrip as the proxy signature to AII . B adds (mi, H(mi)) to T3.
7. Forgery: Assume AII outputs a valid proxy signature
σ∗ = (σ∗0, {σ∗i }i∈ω∗∪Ω∗ , σ′0)
for predicate Υ∗k,ω∗ . If H(mw) 6= ga
′
δ or Ω∗ 6= Ω∗ where Ω∗ are the dummy
attributes, B will abort. Therefore
σ∗ = (σ∗0, {σ∗i }i∈ω∗∪Ω∗ , σ′0)
= (gα2
∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω∗
H(attri)
riH(mw)
raH(m)skp , {gri}i∈ω∗∪Ω∗ , gra).
Thus B can compute
gαβ =
σ∗0∏
i∈ω∗∪Ω∗(σ
∗
i )
ai(σ′0)
a′δ(pkp)ri
because H(attri) = g
ai , H(mw) = g
a′δ .
Next, we analysis the success probability of B, B will not abort if the following
conditions holds:
• H(mw) = gaδ .
• Correct guess of d− k elements Ω∗ from Ω.
Therefore the success probability of B in solving CDH problem is:
SuccCDHB =
ε
qH2C
d−k
d−1
.
Theorem 5.2. Our attribute-based proxy signature scheme is secure against the
AIII chosen message attacks if the CDH Problem is hard.
Proof. Let G1 be a bilinear pairing group of prime order p. Algorithm B is given
g, gα, gβ ∈ G1 which is a random instance of the CDH problem. Its goal is to compute
gαβ. Algorithm B will simulate the challenger and interact with the adversary AIII
as described below.
Let’s recall the definition of the adversary AIII . AIII has the attribute key of the
original signer as well as the public of the proxy signer, thus the attribute key
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extraction and delegation queries are not needed here. The simulation is performed
as follows:
1. Setup: B sets the public keys of the users and the common parameter as :
• B selects a random generator g ∈R G1 and two random number x, g2 ∈R Z∗p,
then B chooses a d − 1 degree polynomial q with q(0) = x and computes
g1 = g
x. B sets skp = α, pkp = gα, where gα, gβ are inputs of the CDH
problem.
• B then sends (G1,G2, e, p, g, x, g1, g2, H) and pkp to AIII .
2. Hash queries:Assume AIII makes qH1, qH2, qH3 times for attribute, warrant
and message queries, respectively. B maintains hash tables T1, T2, T3 for at-
tribute, warrant and message queries. For the hash queries for the attribute
and warrant, B performs the same as in Theorem 1. For the message query
on any m of AIII ’s choice, B chooses a random number I ∈ (1, qH3), for each
query on message mi, if (mi, H(mi)) exits in hash table, B just returns H(mi)
to AIII , otherwise, the simulation is performed as follows:
• If mi 6= mI , B chooses random ri ∈R Zp, returns H(mi) = gri and adds
(mi, H(mi)) to T .
• If mi = mI , B chooses random rI ∈R Zp, return H(mI) = (gβ)rI .
3. Proxy Signing Queries: Suppose AIII issues a proxy signing query for
a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ under a warrant W with predicate Υk,ω∗ . B first
generates the attribute key skω using the same method as the attribute key
extraction queries in Theorem 1. Then B generates the delegation key
dsk = (σ0, {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ , σ′0) using the method same as Delegation signing
key queries in Theorem 1. Then B simulates the proxy signature queries as
follows:
• If M ∈ T3, assume H(M) = grM , B simulates the proxy signature σ =
(σ1, σ2, σ3) where σ1 = σ0 · pkrMp , σ2 = {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ and σ3 = σ′0.
• If M /∈ T3, B chooses random r∗ ∈R Zp and simulates the proxy signature
as σ1 = σ0 · pkr
∗
p , σ2 = {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ and σ3 = σ′0. B adds (M,H(M)) to hash
table T .
4. Forgery: Assume that the adversary AIII can output a proxy signature σ∗ =
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2, σ
∗
3, ) of the message M
∗ under the warrant W ∗ for predicate Υ∗ such
that:
• (M∗,W ∗) has not been submitted as one of the proxy signing queries.
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• σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2, σ∗3) is a valid proxy signature.
In this case, if M∗ = mI , B can compute:
gαβ = (
σ∗1
gx2
∏
i∈ω∪Ω∗(σ
∗
2)
ai(σ∗3)
a′δ
)
1
rI
Next, we analyse the success probability of B. B will not abort if the following
conditions hold:
• H(mw) = gaδ .
• H(M) = (gβ)rI .
• Correct guess of d− k elements Ω∗ from Ω.
Therefore,
SuccCDHB =
ε
qH2(qH3 + qps)C
d−k
d−1
.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we studied attribute-based proxy signature (ABPS) for threshold
predicates. We presented a formal security model and a concrete construction of
ABPS scheme. Our model has considered different types of potential adversaries
against an ABPS scheme. An interesting feature of our scheme is that it offers orig-
inal signer privacy, that is even the proxy signer cannot find out who is the original
signer except that the original signer’s attributes satisfy a pre-claimed predicate.
We leave the problem of building ABPS for other types of predicates as our future
work.
Chapter 6
Security of Delegation-by-Warrant
Proxy Signature Schemes
In this chapter, we identify a new attack that has been neglected by many existing
proven secure proxy signature schemes. We demonstrate this attack by launching it
against an identity-based proxy signature scheme which is proven secure. We then
propose one method that can effectively prevent this attack. The weakness in some
other proxy signature schemes can also be fixed by applying the same method.
6.1 Introduction
The concept of proxy signature was introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto
in 1996 [MUO96]. They presented three different types of proxy signature, namely
full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant in their seminal work.
Shortly after Mambo et al.’s work, Kim et al. [KPW97] proposed a new type of
proxy signature combing partial delegation and warrant. They demonstrated that
schemes combining partial delegation and warrant can provide a higher level of
security than schemes based on partial delegation or warrant separately. Since then,
proxy signature has been extensively researched in different settings, such as blind
proxy signature [ZSNL], anonymous proxy signature [SW02, FP08], and identity-
based proxy signature [WMS+07].
These delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes can be further classified
into two categories according to whether the proxy signature is generated by the
proxy signer using his own private key or not. In the first type, the proxy signer
generates a new proxy signing key using the delegation information and his own
private key. The proxy signatures are generated under the new proxy signing key.
The proxy signature schemes in [Zha97, LKK01b, LKK01a, Wan05, LYMW13] fall
into the first type. In the second type, the proxy signer issues a proxy signature
using his own private key. The proxy signatures are essentially combinations of the
original signer’s signature on the warrant and the proxy signer’s signature on the
message. Such proxy signature schemes could be found in [HSMW06, WMS+07,
LKZC07, SXYM11, LMY14a]
On the security modeling of proxy signature, Boldyreva et al. [BPW12] proposed
a comprehensive security model for the delegation by warrant proxy signature, where
an original signer can also perform self-delegation. Malkin et al. [MOY04] extended
47
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the security model to allow fully hierarchical proxy signatures. They also proved that
proxy signatures are essentially equivalent to key-insulated signatures. The security
model proposed in [BPW12, MOY04] is in the registered key model, which means
the adversary has to submit every public and private key pair in the security game
except the challenge one. Later, Schuldt et al. [SMP08] proposed an enhanced
security model for proxy signature by allowing the adversary to query arbitrary
proxy signing keys.
Our Contributions. We revisit proxy signature and show an attack that has
been neglected by the second type of proxy signature schemes [HSMW06, LKZC07,
WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a] that have been proven secure. In these schemes, a
proxy signature is essentially the combination of the original signer’s standard sig-
nature on a warrant and the proxy signer’s standard signature on a message. In the
security analysis, it is assumed that an adversary has access to the original signer and
proxy signer’s standard signature oracles. We show that under such a circumstance,
some proxy signature schemes [HSMW06, LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a]
that have been previous proved secure are in fact not secure.
We demonstrate a new attack by launching it against an identity-based proxy
signature scheme [WMS+07] that has been proven secure. We show that a malicious
adversary can create a proxy signature on a message, if he has access to the standard
signature of the original signer and proxy signer, which is as defined in the security
models in [HSMW06, WMS+07]. Thus, these proxy signature schemes [HSMW06,
LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a] , which we believe is not a complete list,
are in fact not secure. We propose an efficient solution by revising the identity-based
proxy signature scheme [WMS+07] to thwart this attack. It is worth noticed that
the same method can also be applied to [HSMW06, LKZC07, SXYM11, LMY14a]
to resist this attack.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We present a new attack in some proxy signature schemes in Section 6.2 by attacking
an identity-based proxy signature scheme. The security model for proxy signature
that captures the attack is presented in Section 6.3. We then revise the identity-
based proxy signature scheme in Section 6.4 and prove its security in Section 6.5.
This chapter is concluded in Section 6.6.
6.2 An Attack in Some Proxy Signature Schemes
In this section, we present an attack that has been neglected by many existing proxy
signature schemes [HSMW06, LKZC07, WMS+07, SXYM11, LMY14a]. To better
explain how an attacker works, we demonstrate this attack via a concrete example.
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Before we start to introduce the attack, we first review an identity-based proxy
signature scheme proposed in [WMS+07].
An Identity-Based Proxy Signature Scheme
1. Setup: Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing map where G1 and G2
are of prime order q. Let P be a generator of G1. Chooses a random number
s ∈ Z∗q and set Ppub = sP . Select three collision-resistant hash functions
H0, H1, H2 such that H0, H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The system parameters
params = {e,G1,G2, q, Ppub, H0, H1, H2}, the master secret key Msk = s.
2. KeyExtract: On input a user’s identity ID, outputs the secret key for this
identity skID = sH0(ID).
3. StandardSign: On input a message m, the standard signature on m under
identity ID is σ = (σ1, σ2) such that σ1 = skID + rH1(M) and σ2 = rP where
r ∈ Zq.
4. StandardVer: On input a standard signature σ = (σ1, σ2) of message m un-
der identity ID, outputs ‘1’ if e(σ1, P ) = e(H0(ID), Ppub)e(H1(m), σ2); Oth-
erwise, output ‘0’.
5. DelegationGen: Let w be a warrant that includes the delegation information
such as the identities of the original signer and the designated proxy signer,
the delegation period, the types of messages that a proxy signer can sign and
so on. Then the original signer with identity IDA generates the delegation
information σw = (σW1 , σW2) such that σW1 = skIDA + rAH1(mw) and σW2 =
rAP where rA ∈ Zq. The original signer sends the delegation signing key σw
to the proxy signer.
6. ProSign: Upon receiving the delegation information σw = (σW1 , σW2) and w
from the original signer, the proxy signer with identity IDB generates a proxy
signature σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3) on a message m such that σM1 = σW1 + skIDB +
rBH2(m), σM2 = σW2 , σM3 = rBP .
7. ProVer: On input the identities IDA, IDB of the original signer and proxy
signer, a warrant w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the proxy
signature σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3), outputs ‘1’ if
e(σM1 , P ) = e(H0(ID1), Ppub)e(H1(w), σM2)e(H0(IDB), Ppub)e(H2(m), σM3).
Otherwise, output ‘0’.
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An Attack Against the ID-based Proxy Signature Scheme
Wu et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme [WMS+07] is proven secure. How-
ever, we show below that if the original signer and proxy signer also use their private
keys to generate standard signatures, which is just as defined in their security mod-
els, then their scheme could be broken by a malicious outsider attacker. Assume the
identities of the original signer and proxy signer are IDA, IDB respectively, in the
security model in [WMS+07], three types of adversaries are defined, namely,
• AI , which is an outsider adversary that has knowledge of (IDA, IDB).
• AII , which is a malicious proxy signer that has knowledge of (IDA, IDB,
skIDB).
• AIII , which is a malicious original signer that has knowledge of (IDA, skIDA ,
IDB).
Since the original signer and proxy signer could use the same key pairs to generate
normal signatures using the standard signature scheme introduced in [WMS+07].
Suppose AI aims to generate a proxy signature σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3) on a message m
with a warrant w, it is worth noticing that AI might obtain such a genius warrant
w when verifies a valid proxy signature. Then AI acts as follows:
• AI requires a standard signature (σA1 , σA2) on warrant w of the original signer with
identity IDA, where w is a warrant containing the delegation information. The
original signer chooses a random rA ∈ Zq and generates the standard signature
(σA1 , σA2) such that σA1 = skIDA + rAH1(w) and σA2 = rAP .
• Upon receiving the standard signature (σA1 , σA2) on w from the original signer.
AI aborts if e(σA1 , P ) 6= e(H0(IDA), Ppub)e(H1(w), σA2).
• AI requires a standard signature (σB1 , σB2) on message w||m of the proxy signer
with identity IDB, where m is a message. The proxy signer chooses a random
rB ∈ Zq and generates the standard signature (σB1 , σB2) such that σB1 = skIDB +
rBH2(w,m) and σB2 = rBP .
• Upon receiving the standard signature (σB1 , σB2) on m from the proxy signer. AI
aborts if e(σB1 , P ) 6= e(H0(IDB), Ppub)e(H2(w,m), σB2).
• If both (σA1 , σA2) and (σB1 , σB2) are valid. AI outputs a proxy signature σ =
(σM1 , σM2 , σM3) on message m with warrant w such that σM1 = σA1 + σB1 =
skIDA +rAH1(w)+skIDB +rBH2(w,m), σM2 = σA2 = rAP and σM3 = σB2 = rBP .
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It can be verified that σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3) is a valid proxy signature. Thus,
the proposed identity-based proxy signature is insecure, since given a proxy signa-
ture σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3), it might come from a malicious adversary. The proposed
attack is a practical attack since a malicious adversary could launch such an at-
tack without notice of both the original signer and the proxy signer. Besides the
scheme mentioned in this section, we have found that the proxy signature schemes
in [HSMW06, LKZC07, SXYM11, LMY14a] are also subjected to this attack.
6.3 Security Model
We revise the security model for identity-based proxy signature defined in [WMS+07]
to capture the new attack in this section. In the security model for proxy signature,
the capability of an adversary is modelled by its ability to query different oracles.
Before we formally define each adversarial game, we first introduce four types of
oracle queries that will appear in the models:
• Key extract query: A can query an identity ID ∈ ID, where ID represents
the identity space, to the key extract oracle OKE(·). The corresponding key skID
is then generated and returned to A.
• Original signer’s standard signing query: A can query the original signer’s
signing oracle OOS′S(·) with any warrant w ∈ W under the original signer’s iden-
tity ID ∈ ID, where W represents the warrant space. The private key skID on
identity ID is generated using the key extraction algorithm. The corresponding
original signer’s signature σo on warrant w is generated and returned to A.
• Proxy signing query: A can query the proxy signing oracle OPS(·) with any
message m ∈ M with warrant w ∈ W of his choice under the original signer’s
identity IDA and the proxy signer’s identity IDB such that IDA, IDB ∈ ID,
where M represents the message space. The private keys skIDA and skIDB on
identities IDA, IDB are generated using the key extraction algorithm. A valid
proxy signature on m is then generated and returned to A.
• Proxy signer’s signing Query: A can query the standard signature with
any message m ∈ M of his choice to the proxy signer’s standard signing ora-
cle OPS′S(·). A valid standard signature of the proxy signer σp on m under the
proxy signer’s identity is then generated and returned to A.
According to the information held by an attacker, three different types of ad-
versaries are defined:
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1. AI : an outsider attacker who only has the identities of the original signer and
the proxy signer that aims to forge a valid proxy signature.
2. AII : a malicious proxy signer who possesses the private key skIDB of the proxy
signer and the identity of the original signer, and tries to forge a valid proxy
signature σ without knowledge of the private key skIDA of the original signer.
3. AIII : a malicious original signer that possesses the private key skIDA of the
original signer and the identity IDB of the proxy signer, and tries to forge a
valid proxy signature σ without knowing the private key skIDB of the proxy
signer.
Adversarial Game with A Malicious Outsider Adversary
We first define the adversarial game between a malicious outsider adversary AI and
a simulator S as follows:
• Setup: The simulator S runs Setup algorithm to generate the params and
MSK, and sends params to AI as well as keeps MSK secret.
• Original signer’s standard signing queries: AI can choose any warrant w ∈
W with the original signer’s identity IDA and queries the original signer’s standard
signing oracle OOS′S. S generates the private key skIDA using the key extract
algorithm skIDA ← KeyExtract(MSK, IDA,
params), then S generates the delegation information σo ← StandardSign
(skIDA , w, params) and sends σo to AI .
• Proxy Signer’s Standard Signature Queries: AI queries the proxy signer’s
standard signing oracle OPS′S with a message m ∈ M of his choice under the
proxy signer’s identity IDB ∈ ID. S generates the private key skIDB using the
key extract algorithm skIDB ← KeyExtract(MSK, IDB,
params), then S generates the standard signature sσ ← StandardSign
(skIDB ,m, params) and sends sσ to AI .
• Forgery Phase: Finally, AI outputs a proxy signature σ∗ on message M∗ for a
warrant W ∗ with the original signer’s identity IDA and the proxy signer’s identity
IDB.
We say AII wins the game if
• ProVer(σ∗, IDA, IDB,W ∗,M∗) = 1;
• (W ∗, IDA) has been queried to the original signer’s standard signing oracle OOS′S;
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• (W ∗,M∗, IDB) has been queried to the proxy signer’s standard signing oracle
OPS′S.
Define the advantage of a malicious adversary AI in winning the game as
AdvAI (κ) = Pr[AI Wins the game].
Definition 6.1. We say an identity-based proxy signature scheme is secure against
an outsider adversary AI if for any probabilistic polynomial time AI , AdvAI (κ) is
negligible in κ.
Adversarial Game with A Malicious Proxy Signer
We first define the adversarial game between a malicious proxy signer AII and a
simulator S as follows:
• Setup: The simulator S runs Setup algorithm to generate the params and
MSK, and sends params to AII as well as keeps MSK secret.
• Key extract queries: AII selects an identity ID such that ID ∈ ID, the
simulator S runs skID ← KeyExtract(MSK, ID, params) and returns skID to
AII .
• Original signer’s standard signing queries: AII can choose any warrant
w ∈ W with an identity ID ∈ ID and queries original signer’s standard signing
oracle OOS′S. S generates the private key skID using the key extract algorithm
skID ← KeyExtract(MSK, ID, params), then S generates the original signer’s
standard signature σo ← StandardSign(skID,
w, params) and sends σo to AII .
• Proxy signing queries: AII chooses a warrant w ∈ W and a message m ∈ M
and queries the proxy signing oracle OPS with the original signer’s identity ID1
and the proxy signer’s identity ID2. S generates
skID1 , skID2 ← KeyExtract(MSK, ID1, ID2, params)
σw ← DelegationGen(skID1 , w, params),
σ ← ProSign(σw, skID2 ,m, params)
and returns σ to AII .
• Forgery Phase: Finally, A outputs a proxy signature σ∗ on message M∗ for a
warrant W ∗ with the original signer’s identity IDA and the proxy signer’s identity
IDB.
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We say AII wins the game if
• ProVer(σ∗, IDA, IDB,W ∗,M∗) = 1;
• IDA has not been queried to the key extraction oracle OKE(·).
• (W ∗, IDA) has not been queried to the delegation oracle ODG;
• (W ∗,M∗, IDA, IDB) has not been queried to the proxy signing oracle OPS.
Define the advantage of a malicious adversary AII in winning the game as
AdvAII (κ) = Pr[AII Wins the game].
Definition 6.2. We say an identity-based proxy signature scheme is secure against
the AII under chosen identity and warrant attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial
time AII , AdvAII (κ) is negligible in κ.
Adversarial Game with A Malicious Original Signer
The adversarial game between a malicious original signer AIII and a simulator S is
defined as follows:
• Setup, Key Extract Queries and Proxy Signing Queries are same as those
in the adversarial game against a malicious proxy signer.
• Proxy Signer’s Standard Signature Queries: AIII queries the proxy signer’s
standard signing oracle Ops′s with a message m ∈ M of his choice under an
identity ID ∈ ID. S generates the private key skID using the key extract algo-
rithm skID ← KeyExtract(MSK, ID, params), then S generates the standard
signature σp ← StandardSign(skID,m, params) and sends σp to AIII .
• Forgery Phase: Finally, AIII outputs a proxy signature σ∗ on message M∗ for a
warrant W ∗ with the original signer’s identity IDA and the proxy signer’s identity
IDB.
We say AIII wins the game if
• ProVer(σ∗, IDA, IDB,W ∗,M∗) = 1;
• IDB has not been queried to the key extraction oracle OKE;
• (W ∗,M∗, IDB) has not been queried to the proxy signer’s standard signing oracle
OPS′S.
• (W ∗,M∗, IDA, IDB) has not been queried to the proxy signing oracle OPS.
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Define the advantage of a malicious adversary AIII in winning the game as
AdvAIII (κ) = Pr[AIII Wins the game].
Definition 6.3. We say an identity-based proxy signature scheme is secure against
the AIII under chosen identity and message attacks if for any probabilistic polyno-
mial time AIII , AdvAIII (κ) is negligible in κ.
6.4 The Revised Identity-Based Proxy Signature
Scheme
We present the revised ID-based proxy signature scheme that efficiently thwarts the
proposed attack in this section.
1. Setup: Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing map where G1 and G2
are of prime order q. Let P be a generator of G1. Chooses a random number
s ∈ Z∗q and set Ppub = sP . Select three collision-resistant hash functions
H0, H1, H2 such that H0, H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The system parameters
params = {e,G1,G2, q, Ppub, H0, H1, H2}, the master secret key Msk = s.
2. KeyExtract: On input a user’s identity ID, outputs the secret key for this
identity skID = sH0(ID).
3. StandardSign: On input a message m, the standard signature on m under
identity ID is σ = (σ1, σ2) such that σ1 = skID + rH1(m) and σ2 = rP , where
r ∈ Z∗q.
4. StandardVer: On input a standard signature σ = (σ1, σ2) of message m
under identity ID, output ‘1’ if e(σ1, P ) = e(H0(ID), Ppub)e(H1(m), σ2); Oth-
erwise, output ‘0’.
5. DelegationGen: Let w be a warrant that includes the delegation information
such as the identities of the original signer and the designated proxy signer,
the delegation period, the types of messages that a proxy signer can sign and
so on. Then the original signer with identity IDA generates the delegation
information σw = (σW1 , σW2) such that σW1 = skIDA+rAH1(w) and σW2 = rAP
where rA ∈ Zq. The original signer sends the delegation information σw to the
proxy signer.
6. ProSign Upon receiving the delegation information σw = (σW1 , σW2) and w
from the original signer, the proxy signer with identity IDB generates a proxy
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signature σ = (σM1 , σM2 , σM3 on a message m such that σM1 = σW1 + skIDB +
rBH2(w,m) + rBH1(w), σM2 = σW2 + rBP , σM3 = rBP .
7. ProVer: On input the identities IDA, IDB of the original signer and proxy
signer, a warrant w and a message m and the proxy signature σ = (σM1 , σM2 ,
σM3), outputs ‘1’ if
e(σM1 , P ) = e(H0(IDA), Ppub)e(H1(w)), σM2) · e(H0(IDB), Ppub)e(H2(w,m)
, σM3)
Otherwise, output ‘0’.
6.5 Security Analysis
In this section we analyse the security of the revised ID-based proxy signature scheme
against AI , AII and AIII adversaries.
Theorem 6.1. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is secure against an
outsider adversary AI if the CDH assumption holds.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction under the random oracle model. Suppose that
exists an outsider adversary AI that has a non-negligible advantage ε in attacking
the proposed scheme, then we can build another algorithm B that uses AI to solve
the CDH problem. Let G1 be a bilinear pairing group of prime order q, B is given
P, aP, bP ∈ G1 which is a random instance of the CDH problem. Its goal is to
compute abP . Algorithm B will simulate the challenger and interact with the forger
AI as described below.
1. Setup: B selects a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 where G1 and G2 are of
prime order q. B chooses a generator P of G1. Let (P, aP, bP ) be the inputs
of the CDH problem. B sets the master public key Ppub = sP where s ∈ Z∗q.
B selects three collision-resistant hash functions H0, H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. B
sends (e,G1,G2, q, P, Ppub, H0, H1, H2) to AII .
2. Hash queries: In the security proof, the hash functions H0, H1, H2 are mod-
elled as random oracles. We regard the identity, warrant and message queries
as H0, H1 and H2 queries respectively. Assume B keeps hash tables T0, T1 and
T2 for these queries.
(a) H0 Query: For each query on identity IDi, if IDi has existed in T0, a
same value H0(IDi) is returned to AII . Otherwise, B chooses a random
ci ∈ Zq and sets H0(IDi) = ciP . B sends ciP to AI as well as stores
(IDi, ci, H0(IDi)) to T0.
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(b) H1 Query: Assume AI makes qH1 warrant queries, B selects a random
number β ∈ (1, qH1), for each query on warrant wi such that 1 ≤ i 6=
β ≤ qH1 , if wi has existed in T1, a same value H1(wi) is returned to AI .
Otherwise,
• If wi 6= wβ, B chooses a random ki ∈ Zq and sets H1(wβ) = kiP . B
sends H1(wβ) to AI as well as stores (wβ, ki, H1(wβ)) to T1.
• If wi = wβ, B sets H1(wβ) = aP . B sends H1(wβ) to AI .
(c) H2 Query: For each query on message mi accompanying with a warrant
wi, if H2(wi,mi) has existed in T2, a same value H2(wi,mi) is returned to
AI . Otherwise, B chooses a random ui ∈ Zq and sets H2(wi,mi) = uiP .
B sends H2(wi,mi) to AI as well as stores ((wi,mi), ui, H2(wi,mi)) to T2.
3. Original signer’s standard signing queries: AI can query the original
signer’s standard signature on a warrant wi. Assume AI makes qos′s queries
with the original signer’s identity IDA, for each query on wi, assume H0(IDA)
and H1(wi) have existed in T0 and T1, if they are not the cases, B performs
the above algorithms to assign values for H0(IDA) and H1(wi). Assume
H0(IDA) = cAP , B simulates as follows:
• If wi 6= wβ, assume H1(wi) = kiP , then B chooses randomly rAi ∈ Zq
and sets σwi = (σwi1 , σwi2) such that σwi1 = cAsP + rAikiP = sH0(IDA) +
rAiH1(wi) and σwi2 = rAiP .
• If wi = wβ, then B chooses randomly rAβ ∈ Zq and sets σβ = (σwβ1 , σ2β2)
such that σwβ1 = cAsP +rAβbP = sH0(IDA)+rAβH1(wβ) and σwβ2 = rAβP .
4. Proxy signer’s standard signing queries: AssumeAI makes qps′s standard
signature queries under the proxy signer’s identity IDB. For each query on
Mi = wi||mi, assume H0(IDB) and H2(Mi) have existed in T0 and T2, if
they are not the cases, B performs the above algorithms to assign values for
H0(IDA) and H2(Mi). Assume H0(IDB) = cBP , B chooses a number δ ∈
(1, qps′s) and simulates as follow:
• If Mi 6= Mδ, assume H2(M2) = uiP , then B chooses randomly rBi ∈ Zq
and sets σpi = (σpi1 , σpi2) such that σpi1 = cBsP + rBikiP = sH0(IDB) +
rBiH2(Mi) and σpi1 = rBiP .
• If Mi = Mδ, assume H2(Mδ) = uδP , then B sets dskδ = (σB1δ , σB2δ) such
that σB1δ = cBsP + buδP = sH0(IDB) + bH2(Mδ) and σB2i = bP
5. Forgery: Assume AI outputs a valid proxy signature σ∗ = (σ∗M1 , σ
∗
M2
, σ∗M3)
on message M∗ under a warrant W ∗ with the proxy signer’s identity IDA and
the proxy signer’s identity IDB. Besides,
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• (IDA,W ∗) has been queried in the original signer’s standard signing queries.
• (IDB,W ∗,M∗) has been queried in the proxy signer’s standard signing
queries.
If W ∗ 6= wβ or M∗ 6= Mδ, B will abort. Otherwise, given the the forged proxy
signature σ∗ = (σ∗M1 , σ
∗
M2
, σ∗M3). B can solve the CDH problem
abP = σM∗1 − σA1β − σB1δ
B will not abort when W ∗ = wβ and M∗ = Mδ. Thus, if there exists an out-
sider adversary AI that has a non-negligible probability ε in breading the proposed
identity-based proxy signature scheme. Then there exist another probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm B that has a probability
SuccCDHB,G1 =
ε
qos′s · qps′s
which is non-negligible. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 6.2. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is secure against the
AII chosen identity and chosen warrant attacks if the CDH assumption holds.
Proof. Let’s recall the definition of AII , AII is a malicious proxy signer possessing
the private key of the proxy signer. With this in mind, the simulation is as follows:
1. Setup: B selects a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 where G1 and G2 are of
prime order q. B chooses a generator P of G1. Let (P, aP, bP ) be the inputs
of the CDH problem. B sets the master public key Ppub = aP . B selects
three collision-resistant hash functions H0, H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. B sends
(e,G1,G2, q, P, Ppub, H0, H1, H2) to AII .
2. Hash queries: Regard the identity, warrant and message queries as H0, H1
and H2 queries respectively. B keeps hash tables T0, T1 and T2 for these
queries.
(a) H0 Query: Assume AII makes qH0 identity queries, choose α ∈ (1, qH0),
for each query on identity IDi such that 1 ≤ i 6= α ≤ qH0 , if IDi has
existed in T0, a same value H0(IDi) is returned to AII . Otherwise,
• If i 6= α, B chooses a random ci ∈ Zq and sets H0(IDi) = ciP . B sends
ciP to AII as well as stores (IDi, ci, H0(IDi)) to T0.
• If i = α, B sets H0(IDα) = bP + cαP where cα ∈ Zq and returns
H0(IDI) to AII . B adds (IDα, cα, H0(IDα)) to T0.
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(b) H1 Query: Assume AII makes qH1 warrant queries, B selects a random
number β ∈ (1, qH1), for each query on warrant wi such that 1 ≤ i 6=
β ≤ qH1 , if wi has existed in T1, a same value H1(wi) is returned to AII .
Otherwise,
• If wi 6= wβ|IDα→o, which means IDα is included in wi and the user with
identity IDα plays the role of original signer in the system. B chooses
a random ki ∈ Zq and sets H1(wi) = kiP − bP . B sends H1(wi) to AII
as well as stores (wi, bi, H1(wi)) to T1.
• If wi 6= wβ|IDα→p, which means IDα is included in wi and the user with
identity IDα plays the role of proxy signer in the system. B chooses a
random ki ∈ Zq and sets H1(wi) = kiP . B sends H1(wi) to AII as well
as stores (wi, ki, H1(wi)) to T1.
• If wi = wβ, B chooses a random ki ∈ Zq and sets H1(wβ) = kiP . B
sends H1(wβ) to AII as well as stores (wβ, ki, H1(wβ)) to T1.
(c) H2 Query: Assume AII makes qH2 message queries, B selects a random
number δ ∈ (1, qH1), for each query on message mi accompanying with a
warrant wi such that 1 ≤ i 6= δ ≤ qH2 , if H2(wi,mi) has existed in T2, a
same value H2(wi,mi) is returned to AII . Otherwise,
• If wi 6= wβ,mi 6= mδ, B chooses a random ui ∈ Zq and setsH2(wi,mi) =
uiP+aP . B sendsH2(wi,mi) toAII as well as stores ((wi,mi), ci, H2(wi,
mi)) to T2.
• If wi = wβ,mi 6= mδ, same as the case when wi 6= wβ,mi 6= mδ.
• If wi 6= wβ,mi = mδ, same as the case when wi 6= wβ,mi 6= mδ.
• If wi = wβ,mi = mδ, B chooses a random ui ∈ Zq and sets H2(wβ,mδ)
= uiP . B sends H2(wβ,mβ) to AII as well as stores ((wβ,mδ), ui, H2
(wβ,mδ)) to T2.
3. Key extraction queries: AII can make key extraction queries on any iden-
tity ID ∈ ID such that ID 6= IDα. If AII makes key extraction query on
identity IDα, B just terminates the simulation and reports a failure. As-
sume AII makes qk key extractions queries, for each query on identity IDi for
1 ≤ i ≤ qk.
• If IDi has existed in table T0, assume H0(IDi) = ciP , then B returns
skIDi = ciaP = aH0(IDi) to AII .
• Otherwise, B chooses a random ci ∈ Zq and sets H0(IDi) = ciP . B returns
skIDi = ciaP to AII and adds (IDi, ci, H0(IDi)) to T0.
4. Original signer’s standard signing queries: AII can query original signer’s
standard signature on a warrant wi ∈ W under an identity IDi ∈ ID. Assume
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AII makes qos′s original signer’s standard signing queries. For each query, as-
sume IDi and wi have been submitted to the H0 and H1 queries respectively.
If they are not the cases, B performs the above algorithms to set values for
H0(IDi) and H1(wi), then B simulates σwi as follows:
• If IDi 6= IDα and wi 6= wβ|IDα→o, assume H0(IDi) = ciP and H1(wi) =
kiP − bP respectively, then B chooses a random ri ∈ Zq and returns the
original signer’s standard signature σwi = (σwi1, σwi2) such that σwi1 =
ciPpub + ri(kiP − bP ) = skIDi + riH1(wi) and σwi2 = riP and to AII .
• If IDi 6= IDα and wi 6= wβ|IDα→p, assume H0(IDi) = ciP and H1(wi) = kiP
respectively, then B chooses a random ri ∈ Zq and returns original signer’s
standard signature σwi = (σwi1, σwi2) such that σwi1 = ciPpub + rikiP =
skIDi + riH1(wi) and σwi2 = riP to AII .
• If IDi = IDα and wi 6= wβ|IDα→o, assume H0(IDi) = bP + ciP and
H1(wi) = kiP − bP respectively, then B simulates the original signer’s stan-
dard signature σwi = (σwi1, σwi2) by setting σwi2 = riP = liP + aP where
li ∈R Z∗q and σwi1 = (ci + ki)Ppub + kiliP − libP . It can be verified that
(σwi1, σwi2) is a correct simulation since:
σwi1 = (ci + ki)Ppub + kiliP − libP
= abP + ciaP + kiaP + kiliP − libP − abP
= a(ciP + bP ) + (a+ li)(kiP − bP )
= aH0(IDα) + riH1(wi)
• If IDi = IDα and wi 6= wβ|IDα→p, since we do not consider self-delegation
in our scheme, then B just terminates the simulation and reports failure.
• If IDi = IDα and wi = wβ, B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
5. Proxy signing queries: AII can query a proxy signature on a message
mi ∈ M under a warrant wi ∈ W with the proxy signer’s identity ID1i
and the original signer’s identity ID2i such that ID1i , ID2i ∈ ID. Assume
ID1i , ID2i have been submitted to the H0 query and wi and wi||mi have been
submitted to the H1 and H2 queries respectively. If they are not the cases, the
above algorithms will be performed to assign new values H0(ID1i), H0(ID2i),
H1(wi) and H2(wi,mi). Assume AII makes qps proxy signing queries. For each
queries on a message mi with warrant wi such that 1 ≤ i ≤ qps, B simulates
the corresponding proxy signature as follows:
(a) If ID1i 6= IDα, ID2i 6= IDα assume H0(ID1i) = c1iP , H0(ID2i) = c2iP ,
then B chooses two random numbers r1i , r2i ∈ Z∗q and returns the proxy
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signature σi = (σMi1 , σMi2 , σMi3) such that σMi1 = c1iaP + r1iH1(wi) +
c2iaP + r2iH2(wi,mi) + r2iH2(mi), σMi2 = (r1i + r2i)P and σMi3 = r2iP
to AII . It is a correct simulation since
e(σMi1 , P )
= e(c1iaP + r1iH1(wi) + c2iaP + r2iH2(wi,mi) + r2iH1(wi), P )
= e(c1iP, aP )e(H1(wi), (r1i + r2i)P )e(c2iP, aP )e(H2(mi, wi), r2iP )
= e(H0(ID1i), Ppub)e(H1(wi), σMi2)e(H0(ID2i), Ppub)e(H2(mi, wi),
σMi3)
(b) If ID1i 6= IDα, ID2i = IDα, assume H0(ID1i) = c1iP , H0(ID2i) =
cαP + bP , then
i. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→o,mi 6= mδ or wi 6= wβ|IDα→o,mi = mδ, B terminates
the simulation and reports failure.
ii. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→p and mi 6= mδ, assume H1(wi) = kiP and H2(wi,mi)
= uiP + aP , B simulates the proxy signature σi = (σMi1 , σMi2 , σMi3 )
by setting σMi3 = r2iP = viP − bP , σMi2 = r1iP + viP − bP and
σMi1 = (c1i + cα + vi)Ppub + r1iH2(wi) + ki(viP − bP ) + ui(viP − bP )
where vi, r1i ∈ Zq. It can be verified that it is a correct simulation
since
e(σMi1 , P )
= e((c1i + cα + vi)Ppub + r1iH2(wi) + ki(viP − bP ) + ui(viP − bP ),
, P )
= e(c1iP, aP )e(H1(wi), (r1i + r2i)P )e(abP + cαaP + viaP + uiviP
− uibP − abP, P )
= e(c1iP, aP )e(H1(wi), (r1i + r2i)P )e(a(bP + cαP, P )e((vi − b)(uiP
+ aP ), P )
= e(H0(ID1i), Ppub)e(H1(wi), σMi2 )e(H0(ID2i), Ppub)e(H2(wi,mi),
σMi3 )
iii. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→p,mi = mδ or wi = wβ,mi 6= mδ, B performs same
as that in case ii.
iv. If wi = wβ and mi = mδ, B terminates the simulation and reports
failure.
(c) If ID1i = IDα, ID2i 6= IDα, assume H0(ID1i) = cαP + bP , H0(ID2i) =
c2iP , then
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i. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→o and mi 6= mδ, assume H1(wi) = kiP − bP and
H2(wi,mi) = uiP+aP . B chooses li, r2i ∈ Z∗q and simulates the proxy
signature σi = (σMi1 , σMi2 , σMi3 ) by setting σMi3 = r2iP , σMi2 =
viP − bP + r2iP and σMi1 = (cα + ki + c2i)Ppub + li(kiP − bP ) +
r2i(kiP − bP ) + r2i(uiP + aP ). It is a correct simulation since
e(σMi1 , P )
= e(cα + ki + c2i)Ppub + li(kiP − bP ) + r2i(kiP − bP ) + r2i(uiP+
aP ), P )
= e(abP + acαP + likiP − libP + akiP − abp+ r2i(kiP − bP ), P )
e(c2iPpub, P )e(r2i(uiP + aP ), P )
= e(a(cαP + bP ), P )e((li + a+ r2i)(kiP − bP ), P )e(c2iP, aP )e(uiP
+ aP, r2iP )
= e(H0(ID1i), Ppub)e(H1(wi), σMi2 )e(H0(ID2i), Ppub)e(H2(wi,mi),
σMi3 )
ii. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→p,mi 6= mδ or wi 6= wβ|IDα→p,mi = mδ, B terminates
the simulation and reports failure.
iii. If wi 6= wβ|IDα→0 and mi = mδ, assume H1(wi) = kiP − bP and
H2(wi,mβ) = uiP + aP , B performs same as that in case i.
iv. If wi = wβ and mi 6= mδ, assume H1(wβ) = kiP and H2(wβ,mi) =
uiP + aP , B chooses vi, r1i ∈ Z∗q and simulates the proxy signature
σi = (σMi1 , σMi2 , σMi3 ) by setting σMi3 = viP − bP , σMi2 = viP −
bP + r1iP and σMi1 = (cα + c2i + vi)Ppub + r1ikiP + ki(viP − bP ) +
ui(viP − bP ). It is a correct simulation since
e(σMi1 , P )
= e((cα + c2i + vi)Ppub + r1ikiP + ki(viP − bP ) + ui(viP − bP ), P )
= e((cα + b)aP + c2iaP + r1ikiP + ki(viP − bP ) + (vi − b)aP + ui
(viP − bP ), P )
= e(cαP + bP, aP )e(kiP, r1iP + viP − bP )e(c2iP, aP )e(uiP, viP−
bP )
= e(H0(ID1i), Ppub)e(H1(wi), σMi2 )e(H0(ID2i), Ppub)e(H2(wi,mi),
σMi3 )
v. If wi = wβ and mi = mδ, B terminates the simulation and reports
failure.
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(d) If ID1i = IDα, ID2i = IDα, B terminates the simulation and reports
failure.
6. Forgery: Assume AII outputs a valid proxy signature σ∗ = (σ∗M1 , σ
∗
M2
, σ∗M3)
on message M∗ under a warrant W ∗ with the proxy signer’s identity IDA and
the proxy signer’s identity IDB. Besides,
• IDA has not been queried in the key extraction queries.
• (IDA,W ∗) has not been queried in the delegation queries.
• (IDA, IDB,W ∗,M∗) has not been queried in the proxy signing queries.
If H0(IDA) 6= bP + cαP or H1(W ∗) 6= kβP or H2(W ∗,M∗) 6= uδP , B will
abort. Otherwise, given the the forged proxy signature σ∗ = (σ∗M1 , σ
∗
M2
, σ∗M3).
B can solve the CDH problem
abP = σ∗M1 − cαaP − kβσ
∗
M2
− c2iaP − uδσ∗M3
when H0(IDA) = bP + cαP , H1(IDB) = kβP and H2(W
∗,M∗) = uδP .
Next, we analysis the success probability of B, B will not abort if the following
conditions holds:
• IDA = IDα.
• W ∗ = wβ.
• M∗ = mδ.
Therefore if AII has a non-negligible probability ε in breaking the proposed ID-based
proxy signature scheme, then the success probability of B in solving CDH problem
is:
SuccCDHB,G1 ≥
ε
(qH0 + qk + qos′s + 2qps)(qH1 + qos′s + qps)(qH2 + qps)
.
which is non-negligible. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 6.3. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is secure against the
AIII chosen message and identity attack if the CDH assumption holds.
Proof. The security is similar to that in Theorem 2. Thus, we just describe it briefly.
1. Setup, Hash queries and Key extract queries are same as those in the
security proof against a malicious proxy signer.
2. Proxy signer’s standard signing queries and Proxy signing queries are
similar to the Original signer’s stand signing queries and Proxy signing
queries in the security for Theorem 2.
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Through simulation, it can be reduced that if there exists a malicious original signer
that can break the proposed scheme with a non-negligible probability ε, then we can
build another probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B that can solve the CDH
problem with a non-negligiblre probability SuccCDHB,G1 such that
SuccCDHB,G1 ≥
ε
(qH0 + qk + qps′s + 2qps)(qH1 + qps′s + qps)(qH2 + qps)
, where qps′s refers to the number of proxy signer’s standard signing queries. Thus,
we reach a contradiction.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a practical attack which has not been considered by
some existing proxy signature schemes. In particular, we took an identity-based
proxy signature scheme to describe how this attack works. We also presented an
enhanced security model that can capture this attack. Our model has considered
different types of potential adversaries against an identity-based proxy signature
scheme and allowed the adversary to query the individual signatures of both the
original signer and the proxy signer. The proposed new scheme inherits the good
features of the original scheme, and at the same time can effectively prevent the
attack. The proposed method can also be applied in other proxy signature schemes
[HSMW06, LKZC07, SXYM11, LMY14a] to ensure an improved security.
Chapter 7
An Efficient Privacy-Preserving E-
Coupon System
Previous work on electronic coupon (e-coupon) systems mainly focused on secu-
rity properties such as unforgeability, double-redemption detection, and anonymity.
However, achieving both traceability against dishonest users and anonymity for hon-
est users without involving any third party is an open problem that has not been
solved by the previous work. Another desirable feature of an e-coupon system that
has not been studied in the literature is user privacy, which means the shop can-
not identify the good (among all the choices specified in the coupon) that has been
chosen by the customer during the redemption process. In this chapter, we present
a novel e-coupon system that can achieve all these desirable properties. We define
the formal security models for these new security requirements, and show that our
new e-coupon system is proven secure in the proposed models. The original scheme
was presented in Inscrypt 2014.
7.1 Introduction
We have reviewed several e-coupon system in the literature [CES+05, Ngu06b,
CGH06]. Besides those properties already mentioned in the literature, there are
some desirable features that should be taken into consideration in an e-coupon sys-
tem. For example, privacy of purchase is an important issue that has been neglected
in existing e-coupon systems [CES+05, Ngu06b, CGH06]. It is important to keep
the choices and buying habits of users private from the coupon issuer. Another issue
is that there is no efficient mechanism to trace malicious users in existing e-coupon
systems without involving a trusted third party.
Our Contributions. In this chapter, we propose a new e-coupon system, which
can achieve all the desirable properties mentioned above, namely unforgeability,
anonymity for honest users, double redemption detection, traceability against dis-
honest users, and user privacy. It is worth noticing that different from a fair e-cash
system [SPC95, FTY98, MNV01], the traceability in our e-coupon system is per-
formed by the merchant (i.e., coupon issuer) rather than the bank, which makes
the task more challenging. In order to achieve unforgeability, anonymity for hon-
est users, double redemption dectection and traceability against dishonest users,
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we design a new variant of blind signature which allows the signer (which is es-
sentially the coupon issuer) to issue a signature (coupon) on a message without
seeing its content. However, different from conventional blind signature schemes
[Cha82, CPS94, JLO97, CKW04, AO00], our scheme involves an extra dynamic
challenge-response verification in the verification phase to ensure that if a coupon is
redeemed more than once, the identity of the coupon holder can be calculated. In
order to achieve user privacy, we employ an oblivious transfer scheme [CT05] in the
redemption protocol.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We provide some definitions in Section 7.2. The formal security model for our
e-coupon system is presented in Section 7.3. We then present our construction in
Section 7.4 and prove its security in Section 7.5. This chapter is concluded in Section
7.6.
7.2 Formal Definition
An e-coupon system consists of two participants, namely, a user and a coupon
issuer, which is also a service provider or shop. Our e-coupon system consists of the
following algorithms.
1. ParamGen: On input a security parameter κ, the parameter generation al-
gorithm outputs the public parameters.
params← ParamGen(1κ)
.
2. KeyGen: On input the public parameter params, the key generation algo-
rithm outputs a key pair for a user or a service provider.
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(params)
.
3. Issue: The issue algorithm is an interactive protocol between the service
provider S and a user U ,
C ← Issue(S(pkS , skS),U(pkU , params)).
The output is an e-coupon for the user.
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4. Redeem: The redeem algorithm is an interactive protocol between a user U
and the service provider S, taking as input an e-coupon C, the public key
pkS of the service provider, the public parameters params, a challenge c from
the service provider S and a corresponding response R from the user U . The
output of this algorithm for the service provider is accept or reject.
‘accept’ or ‘reject’← RedeemS(pkS , params,C, c, R).
The output of this algorithm for the user is the item itemi of his choice or a
failure symbol.
‘⊥’ or itemi ← RedeemU(pkS , params,C, c, R).
5. Reveal: The reveal algorithm is executed by the service provider, taking a se-
quence of the challenge-response pairs and the corresponding redeemed coupon
{(c1, R1), (c2, R2), C} and the public parameters params as input, outputs the
identity IDU of the corresponding user or a failure symbol ‘⊥’.
IDU or ‘⊥’← Reveal((c1, R1), (c2, R2), C, params).
7.3 Security Model
We formalize four security requirements for our e-coupon system, that is unforge-
ability, user anonymity, double-redemption detection, and user privacy.
Unforgeability
Unforgeability requires that an adversary A (could be a malicious user) cannot
forge a new valid coupon that can be redeemed successfully with an honest service
provider S. The adversarial game for unforgeability between an adversary A and a
simulator B is defined as follows:
1. ParamGen: The simulator B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public
parameters params.
2. KeyGen: The simulator B generates two key pairs (pkS , skS) and (pkU , skU),
B sends pkS and (pkU , skU) to A and keeps skS secret.
3. Issue queries: Assume A makes qs issue queries to the issuing oracle I(·), for
the i-th query, 1 ≤ i ≤ qs, A runs the issue protocol with B in an interactive
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manner, after each query, A obtains a coupon
Ci ← Issue(S(pkS , skS),U(pkU , params)).
4. Challenge: Finally, A outputs a new coupon C∗. We say A wins the game
if this coupon has not appeared in any issue query but can be redeemed suc-
cessfully by A, i.e.,
• ‘accept’← RedeemS(pkS , params,C∗, c, R).
• C∗ 6= Ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ qs.
Define the advantage of a adversary A in winning the unforgeability game as
AdvunfA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]
Definition 7.1. An e-coupon system is said to be unforgeable if AdvunfA (κ) is neg-
ligible for any PPT adversary A.
Anonymity
Anonymity requires that if one user follows the protocol honestly, even a malicious
service provider cannot link one redeemed coupon to the identity of the user. The
adversarial game between A and simulator B for anonymity is defined as follows:
1. ParamGen: The simulator B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public
parameters params.
2. KeyGen: The simulator B generates key pairs for a service provider (pkS , skS)
and two users U0 (pkU0 , skU0) and U1 (pkU1 , skU1) respectively, B sends (pkS , skS ,
pkU0 , pkU1) to A.
3. Issue queries: Assume A runs Issue algorithm q times with U0 and U1
respectively. Let C0 = {C1U0 , C
2
U0 , . . . , C
q
U0} and C
1 = {C1U1 , C
2
U1 , . . . , C
q
U1} be
the coupon set obtained by U0 and U1.
4. Challenge: A outputs an index 1 ≤ i ≤ q. B flips a coin to decide a value
b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, and returns CiUb∗ to A. A makes a guess b
′ of the value b∗.
We say A wins the game if b′ = b∗. Define the advantage of a adversary A in winning
the game as
AdvAnoA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]−
1
2
Definition 7.2. An e-coupon system is said to provide anonymity if AdvAnoA (k) is
negligible for any PPT adversary A.
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Double-redemption detection
Detection of double-redemption is a major concern for any digital coupon system.
An e-coupon system is said to provide double-redemption detection if one user can-
not redeem one coupon twice with the same service provider without being caught.
In our e-coupon system, if one coupon is redeemed twice, the service provider can
find a polynomial time algorithm to trace the identity of the user with overwhelm-
ing probability. The adversarial game for double-redemption detection is defined as
follows:
1. ParamGen: The simulator B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public
parameters params.
2. KeyGen: The simulator B generates two key pairs (pkU , skU) and (pkS , skS),
B sends (pkU , skU) and pkS to A.
3. Issue queries: Assume A makes qd coupon issuing queries. S runs the Issue
algorithm with A to issue a sequence of coupons {C1, C2, . . . , Cqd} for A.
4. Redeem queries: A runs the redeem protocol with S with any coupon of his
choice.
5. Challenge: A outputs two pairs (C∗, c∗1, R∗1) and (C∗, c∗2, R∗2). We say A wins
the game if
• (C∗, c∗1, R∗1) 6= (C∗, c∗2, R∗2).
• RedeemS(pkS , params,C∗, c∗1, R∗1) = 1 and RedeemS(pkS , params,
C∗, c∗2, R
∗
2) = 1.
• ‘⊥’←Reveal((c∗1, R∗1), (c∗2, R∗2), C∗, params)
Define the advantage of A in winning the adversarial game above as
AdvdrdA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]
Definition 7.3. An e-coupon system is said to provide double-redemption detection
if AdvdrdA (κ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
User privacy
We formalize a new security property which has not been considered in previous e-
coupon systems. When a valid user redeems an e-coupon with the service provider, it
is desirable that the service provider cannot make a connection between the coupon
from the user and the service that is redeemed by the user if the coupon can be used
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to redeem an item from a list of options. The adversarial game for user privacy is
defined as follows.
1. ParamGen: The simulator B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public
parameters params.
2. KeyGen: The simulator B generates two key pairs (pkU , skU) and (pkS , skS),
B sends (pkS , skS) and pkU to A.
3. Issue queries: A runs the Issue algorithm with B to generate a set of coupons
C = {C1, C2, . . . , CqR}.
4. Guess: A outputs an index 1 ≤ i ≤ qR. B then redeems Ci with A to choose
an item mb∗ from {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, which is the set of items that can be
redeemed by B. Finally, A makes a guess b′ ∈ [1, n] for b∗.
We say A wins the game if b′ = b∗. Define the success probability of the adversary
A in making a successful guess about the service that the user choose as
AdvupA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]−
1
n
Definition 7.4. An e-coupon system is said to provide user privacy if AdvupA (κ) is
negligible for any PPT adversary A.
7.4 Proposed Scheme
We denote in our system the service provider by S and a user by U . Denote
{m1,m2, . . . ,mn} the set of items that can be redeemed. The detail description
of our e-coupon system is as follows.
1. ParamGen: On input a security parameter κ ∈ N, generates the system
parameters paras = (G, g, p, q,H1, H2), where Gq is the subgroup of Zp with
prime order q and g is a generator of Gq, where p = 2q + 1 is also prime.
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Gq and H2 : Gq → {0, 1}κ are two collision-resistant hash
functions.
2. KeyGen: On input a security parameter κ ∈ N and the public parameter
params, randomly choose x, y ∈R Z∗q and calculate gx, gy and output the
private and public key pairs (skU = x, pkU = g
x) and (skS = y, pkS = g
y) for
the user and service provider respectively.
3. Issue: The issue protocol is performed through interactive communications
between the service provider S and a user U . The result of the issue protocol
is that S generates a valid coupon for a user U .
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• On receiving a request from U , S chooses k ∈R Z∗q and computes δ1 ← pkkU
and δ2 ← gk sends (δ1, δ2) to U .
• After receiving (δ1, δ2) from S, U checks whether δ1 = δskU2 . If the verification
fails, U stops; otherwise, U chooses x1 ∈ Z∗p and computes α ← (gxy)
x1 ,
β ← (gx)x1 and λ = gx1 , m← H1(α, β, λ). U chooses two different random
number a, b and computes r ← mβaδ
bx1
a
1 and m
′ ← aH1(m,r)
b
, U sends m′ to
S.
• S computes the signature s′ = m′y + k on the blind message m′ and sends
s′ to U .
• U verifies if gs′ ≡ Y m′δ2 mod p, if the equation holds, U removes the blind
factor b by calculating s = s
′b
a
+ a and stores (α, β, λ, r, s); otherwise, abort.
4. Redeem: The redeem protocol is performed as follows:
• After receiving a redeem request from the user, S generates a challenge
c = H1(IDS ||Date||Time) and sends c to U .
• After receiving c, U computes R = x1 + cx1x and choose σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
and a random number ai ∈ Z∗q, wσi = H1(σi) and A = wσigai . U sends
(c, R, α, β, λ, r, s) and A to S.
• S checks if H1(α, β, λ) = β−sαH1(H1(α,β,λ),r)r and gR = λβc. If the equation
not holds, aborts; otherwise, S computes D = Ay, wi = H1(i) and ci =
mi ⊕H2(wyi ), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. S sends D and c1, c2, . . . , cn to U .
• U computes K = D/Y ai and recover mσi = cσi ⊕H2(K).
5. Reveal: Assume the coupon C = (α, β, λ, r, s) is redeemed twice, the S could
get two challenge-response pairs (R1, c1) and (R2, c2) on C such that R1 =
x1 + c1x1x and R2 = x1 + c2x1x. It is obvious that S could calculate x and
x1, thus the identity of U is traced by S.
6. Correctness: The correctness check for validity of the coupon is as follows:
β−sαH1(H1(α,β,λ),r)r
= (pkx1U )
−s(gxyx1)rr
= (pkx1U )
−H1(H1(α,β,λ),r)y− kba −a(pkx1U )
H1(H1(α,β,λ),r)ym(pkx1U )
a(pkx1U )
kb
a
= m
= H1(α, β, λ)
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The correctness check for a user U to recover the correct message is as follows:
cσi ⊕H2(K)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2(A
y/Y ai)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2((wσig
ai)y/Y ai)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2((wσi)
y)
= mσi
7.5 Security Analysis
Theorem 7.1. The proposed e-coupon system is unforgeable.
Proof. The security proof is by contradiction. We will prove that if there exists a
PPT adversary A that can forge a coupon, then there exists another algorithm B
that can break the OMDL assumption with a non-negligible probability. Suppose
there exists a polynomial time forge adversary A which can break the unforgeability
of our system with a non-negligible probability ε. B is the simulator in our proof and
has access to two types of oracles. The first is discrete logarithm oracle DLogGq,g(·)
which takes Pi ∈ Gq as input and returns pi ∈ Zq such that gpi = Pi. The second is
a challenge oracle C(·) which takes noting as input, but for each time it is invoked
it returns a challenge P ∈ Gq. Besides, B maintains an H-table to record all the
hash queries and the corresponding answers. Assume A makes qh hash queries and
qs coupon issuing queries, the simulation is as follows:
1. ParamGen: B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public parameters
(G, p, q, g,H1, H2).
2. KeyGen: B runs KeyGen to generate a key pair (skU , pkU). B queries the
challenge oracle C(·) and sets the response P0 as the public key of the shop
pkS = P0. B sends (p, g, pkS) and (skU , pkU) to A.
3. Hash queries: For each hash query with an input message m, B first checks
the H-table:
• If there exists a pair (m,h) in the H-table,where m refers to the message
queried before, B returns h as the answer to A.
• Otherwise, B chooses a random h ∈ Zq, sends h to A as the answer for the
hash query, and adds (m,h) into the H-table.
4. Issue queries: Upon receiving an issuing query, B make a query to the chal-
lenge oracle C(·) and obtains a challenge Pi. B then sets (δ1, δ2) = (P skUi , Pi)
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and sends (δ1, δ2) to the adversary. After receiving a message mi, B sends
PiP
mi
0 to the discrete logarithm oracle DLog(·) and gets a response zi, and
sends zi to A. Since zi = DLogGq,g(PiPmi0 ) = DLogGq,g(Pi) +miDLogGq,g(P0).
In A’s view, B simulates the signer perfectly.
5. Challenge: Suppose A can successfully forge a new coupon C∗ = (α∗, β∗, λ∗,
r∗, s∗) where s∗ = ep0+r
′, and C∗ can pass the redemption protocol. According
to the Forking lemma [PS96] by rewinding A to the step where H1(m∗, r∗) = e
is determined and providing a new hash value for H1(m
∗, r∗) = ê. B can
generate another valid coupon Ĉ∗ = (α∗, β∗, λ∗, r∗, ŝ∗) where ŝ∗ = e′p0 + r
′.
Then B can compute
p0 = DLogGq,g(P0) =
s∗ − ŝ∗
e− ê
.
Once B obtains p0, for each challenge Pi from the challenge oracle C(·), it can
calculate pi = zi −mip0 for each Pi. Therefore, B can successfully solve the OMDL
problem.
Theorem 7.2. The proposed e-coupon system provides anonymity.
Proof. Anonymity of the user requires the service provider cannot link a redeemed
coupon to an honest user. The proof is by contradiction, suppose that there exists
a PPT adversary A which can break anonymity of our e-coupon system with a non-
negligible probability ε, then we can build an algorithm B that use A to solve the
DDH problem with a non-negligible probability. Let (g, ga, gb, gz) be an instance of
the DDH problem, the purpose of B is to decide whether gz = gab. The simulation
is as follows:
1. ParamGen: B runs algorithm ParamGen to generate public parameters
(G, p, q, g,H1, H2).
2. KeyGen: B choose two random number s∗, r0 ∈ Z∗p and computes S∗ = gs
∗
,
S sets key pair of the service provider as (pkS , skS) = (S∗, s∗) and the public
keys of two valid users U0 and U1 as pkU0 = gr0 and pkU1 = gb respectively. B
sends (pkS , skS) and pkU0 , pkU1 to A.
3. Issuing queries: B performs Issuing queries with A as follows.
(a) For U0, B knows the private key of U0. Thus B just follows the Issue
protocol to obtains a set of coupons {C1U0 , C
2
U0 , . . . , C
qc
U0};
(b) For U1, B simulates the queries as follows:
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• Upon receiving a pair (δ1, δ2) = (pkkiU1 , g
ki) from A. B executes the
extractor defined in the KEA assumption [BP04] to extract the value
ki. If A misbehaves to generate a fake pair (δ′1, δ′2). The extractor will
return a failure symbol ‘⊥’ and thus B stops this query. Otherwise, B
chooses a random number ri and sets αi = g
(z)s∗ri , βi = g
(z)ri , λi = g
(a)ri
and computes mi = H1(αi, βi, λi).
• B chooses two random number ai, bi ∈ Zq and computes r = migzriai
· g
zkibi
ai and m′ = aiH1(mi,r)
bi
. B sends m′ to A.
• On receiving an s̄ from A, B calculates s = s̄bi
ai
+ ai, and stores
(αi, βi, λi, r, s).
Let C0 = {C1U0 , C
2
U0 , . . . , C
qc
U0} and C
1 = {C1U1 , C
2
U1 , . . . , C
qc
U1} be the q coupons
generated for U0 and U1 respectively in this phase.
4. Challenge: After receiving the index i, B flips a coin to decide a value b∗ ∈
{0, 1} and returns CiUb∗ to A. A finally returns b
′. B outputs ‘1’ if b′ = b∗.
Otherwise, B outputs ‘0’.
We finish the simulation for the e-coupon system. Assume a PPT A have a non-
negligible probability ε in breaking anonymity of our scheme. Then the probability
of B to solve the DDH problem ADDHB (κ) can be calculated as follows:
ADDHB (κ)
= Pr[A wins|gz = gab]− Pr[A wins|gz = gr]
= Pr[b∗ = b′|gz = gab]− Pr[b∗ = b′|gz = gr]
=
1
2
+ ε− (Pr[b∗ = b′|gz = gr ∧ b∗ = 0]Pr[b∗ = 0] + Pr[b∗ = b′|gz = gr ∧ b∗ = 1]
· Pr[b∗ = 1])
=
1
2
+ ε− 1
2
(
1
2
+ ε+
1
2
)
=
1
2
ε
which is non-negligible. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 7.3. The proposed e-coupon system provides double-redemption detection.
Proof. According to our e-coupon system, if U has double-redeemed a coupon
(α, β, λ, r, s), then B obtains two different challenge-response pairs (c1, R1) and
(c2, R2) on the coupon where R1 = x1 + c1x1x and R2 = x1 + c2x1x, therefore,
the secret key x of U can be easily calculated as follows:
x =
R2 −R1
c2R1 − c1R2
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Thus, the public key of the user could be obtained by the service provider by further
calculating y = gx mod p.
Theorem 7.4. The proposed e-coupon system provides unconditionally user privacy.
Proof. User privacy of our e-coupon system can be prove by following the receiver’s
privacy in the oblivious transfer scheme proposed in [CT05]. For any A = wσig
ai ,
there exists wl and a
′
l such that l 6= σi, but A = wlga
′
l . Thus in the service provider’s
view, A could be a masked value of any index. Thus, the user’s choices are uncon-
ditionally secure.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a practical e-coupon system which enables the coupon
issuer to trace the identity of misbehaving users, while maintain the anonymity for
the honest users. We achieved this without requiring any third party in the system.
In addition, we formalized the notion of user privacy during the coupon redemption
process and proved that our new e-coupon system also satisfied this property.
Chapter 8
Efficient Oblivious Transfer with Re-
trievable Receiver’s Privacy
To achieve traceability against users’ redemption privacy in an e-coupon system, we
construct two oblivious transfer schemes with some new properties in this chapter.
Oblivious transfer (OT) has been applied widely in privacy-sensitive systems such
as on-line transactions and electronic commerce to protect users’ sensitive informa-
tion. Traceability is a desirable feature of such systems where the privacy of the
honest users are protected unconditionally while the misbehaving users’ privacy can
be traced. However, previous research on OT mainly focused on designing protocols
with unconditional receiver’s privacy. Thus, traditional OT schemes cannot fulfill
the traceability requirements in the aforementioned applications. In this chapter,
we address this problem by presenting a novel OT with retrievable receiver’s privacy
(OTRRP) without involvement of any trusted third party. In the new system, an
honest receiver is able to make a fixed number of choices with perfect receiver pri-
vacy. However, if the receiver misbehaves and tries to request more than a pre-fixed
number of choices, then all his previous choices could be traced by the sender. We
first define the formal definition and security model for OTRRP, and then propose
two efficient OTRRP schemes and prove their security under the proposed security
model.
8.1 Introduction
As reviewed in Section 2.3, all the previous research on OT aimed to design OT
schemes with unconditional receiver and sender privacy. In real-world applications
[AIR01, LMY14b], it is desirable for the sender to trace the choices of the receiver if
they misbehave. Thus, the previous OT schemes are not suitable in these scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one work [MXZ11] on constructing OT
scheme with retrievable receiver’s privacy. Unfortunately, this OT scheme involves
a trusted time server that publishes trapdoors on a time basis, and using the trap-
door the privacy of all the receivers, including the honest ones, will be lost. The
motivation of this work is to propose a new OT with retrievable receiver’s privacy
such that the privacy of an honest receiver is protected unconditionally while all
the previous choices of a misbehaving receiver can be revealed by the sender if the
receiver makes more than the pre-determined number of choices in the OT protocol.
76
CHAPTER 8. NOVEL OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER SCHEMES 77
Our Contributions. In this chapter, we present two novel oblivious transfer
schemes that allow a sender to reveal the dishonest receivers’ privacy without the
help of any trusted third party. To be more specific, our proposed OTkn schemes can
achieve the following properties:
1. The receiver can only obtain a fix number of messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk from
the message set {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} held by the sender where σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The receiver’s choice is hidden from the sender.
2. The receiver cannot learn anything on message mi such that i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . ,
σk} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. If receiver makes more than k requests, then all his previous choices (mσ1 ,mσ2 ,
. . . ,mσk) could be traced by the sender.
We construct two efficient adaptive OTkn schemes with retrievable receiver’s privacy
and prove its security under the half-simulation model [NP05].
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We introduce the formal definition in Section 8.2 and the security model in Section
8.3 separately. Two ORTTP schemes and their security analysis are presented in
Section 8.4 and Section 8.5 separately. This chapter is concluded in Section 8.6.
8.2 Formal Definition
We present the formal definition of OTRRP in this section. There are two partici-
pants in an OT system, namely, a sender S and a receiver R. S possesses a set of
messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and R makes a set of choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} such that
σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Formal Definitions of OTRRP
An OTRRP scheme is essentially an interactive protocol consisting of a tuple of PPT
algorithms (Setup, Commitment (Optional), Request, Response, Extract, Reveal).
1. Setup: Taking as input of a security parameter κ, the setup algorithm outputs
the system public parameters.
params← Setup(1κ)
2. KeyGen: Taking as input of the public parameter params, the key generation
algorithm outputs a retrievable key pair (rpk, rsk) for the receiver and a one-
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time key pair for the sender.
(rpk, rsk)← KeyGen(params)
(opk, osk)← KeyGen(params)
3. Commitment (Optional): Taking as input of the system parameters params,
the retrievable public key rpk of the receiver, the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn
and one-time secret key osk of the sender, the commitment algorithm outputs
a set of ciphertext c1, c2, . . . , cn.
c1, c2, . . . , cn ← Commitment(rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params)
4. Request : Taking as input of the intended indexes σ, the retrievable private key
rsk and params, this algorithms outputs the commitment of the user’s choice.
Aσ ← Request(σ; rsk; params)
5. Response: Taking as input of the commitment Aσ from the receiver, the secret
of the sender, the output of the algorithm is response of the sender.
Dσ ← Response(Aσ, sk, params)
If there is no Commitment algorithm in the scheme, then there are some
additional outputs c1, c2, . . . , cn of the Response algorithm such that:
c1, c2, . . . , cn, Dσ ← Response(Aσ, rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params)
where c1, c2, cn are ciphertexts of m1,m2, . . . ,mn.
6. Extract : Taking as input of the response Dσ from the sender, the cipertext
cα and the system parameters params, output the message of the receiver’s
choice.
mσ ← Extract(Dσ, cσ, params)
7. Reveal : The Reveal algorithm is performed by the sender, taking as input of
the k+ 1 transcripts Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk+1 from a receiver, the retrievable public
key rpk and params, outputs the receiver’s choice σ1, σ2, . . . , σk.
σ1, σ2, . . . , σk ← Reveal(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk+1 ; rpk; params)
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Correctness : We require that for any security parameter κ ∈ N, if params ←
ParamGen(1κ), (rpk, rsk) ← KeyGen(params), (opk, osk) ← KeyGen(params),
c1, c2, . . . , cn ← Commitment(rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params), Aσ ← Request(σ;
rsk, params), Dσ ← Response(Aσ, osk; parmas),
or params ← ParamGen(1κ), (rpk, rsk) ← KeyGen(params), (opk, osk) ←
KeyGen(params), Aσ ← Request(σ; rsk, params), c1, c2, . . . , cn, Dσ ← Response(Aσ,
rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params), then
• The receiver can extract the correct message.
Pr(mσ ← Extract(Dσ, rsk, params)) = 1.
• If the receiver makes less than k + 1 requests, then the sender cannot obtain any
information about the receiver’s choice.
Pr(‘ ⊥ ’← Reveal(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσδ ; rpk; params|δ ≤ k)) = 1.
• If the receiver makes more than k requests, then the sender can trace the previous
choice of the receiver.
Pr(σ1, σ2, . . . , σδ ← Reveal(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσδ ; rpk; params|δ > k)) = 1.
8.3 Security Model
In this section, we revise the half-simulation model proposed in [NP05] to evaluate
the security of the proposed OTRRP scheme. Besides the sender and receiver’s
privacy, we define a new security property named retrievability to capture the new
feature of OTRRP. In the half-simulation model, the security of the sender and
receiver is considered separately. Assume the sender S holds a set of messages
{m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and the receiver possesses a set of choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} such
that σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. A secure OTRRP scheme should meet the
following security requirements:
1. Receiver’s Privacy :
• If R makes less than k + 1 requests, then S cannot obtain any information
about R’s choice.
• For any two different choice sets C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} and C ′, the transcripts
A = {Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk} and A′ = {A′σ1 , A
′
σ2
, . . . , A′σk} received by S corre-
sponding to M = {mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk} and M′ = {m′σ1 ,m
′
σ2
, . . . ,m′σk} are
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indistinguishable if the received messages M = {mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk} and
M′ = {m′σ1 ,m
′
σ2
, . . . ,m′σk} are identically distributed.
2. Sender’s Privacy :
• R cannot obtain any information on mi, i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• In the half-simulation model, the security of R is defined by the real-
world/ideal-world paradigm. In the real world, R and S execute the pro-
tocol. In the ideal world, the protocol is implemented with the help a
trusted third party (TTP). S sends all the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the
TTP. While R sends his choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} adaptively to the TTP. If
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the TTP sends messages {mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk}
to the receiver. An OTRRP scheme is said to provide the privacy of the
sender if for any receiver R in real world, there exists an probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) R′ in the ideal world such that the output of R
and R′ are indistinguishable.
3. Retrievability :
If a dishonest receiver R makes k + 1 choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk, σk+1} from S,
supposeA = {Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk , Aσk+1} is the transcript set of the k+1 choices,
then S is able to trace R’s choices through an efficient PPT algorithm Reveal.
8.4 Our First Scheme and Security Analysis
Construction overview
In this section, we present one oblivious transfer scheme that can achieve all the
desirable features. To be more specific, in our system, each receiver is associated
with a retrievable key pair. During each execution of the OT protocol, the public
retrievable key is used to hide the choice of the receiver. Meanwhile, the receiver
has to create a share of the secret retrievable key using Shamir’s Secret Sharing
scheme and then include the share in the transaction. This is achieved through an
efficient Non-interactive Proof of Knowledge which allows the prover to check that
a correct share is indeed sent by the receiver. If the receiver performs more than
the allowed transactions, then the sender can retrieve the receiver’s secret key and
use it to recover the choices the receiver has made in all the transactions.
In order to better understand the proposed scheme, we first introduce some notations
used in the construction.
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Table 8.1: Notations Used in The Proposed OTRRP Scheme
s1, . . . , sk k random secrets
S1, . . . , Sk commitments on s1, . . . , sk
Ai transcript on the receiver’s choice
Bi commitment on the random number ri
B′i commitment on the receiver’s αi
f(Bi) one verifiable secret share
8.4.1 The First Proposed OTRRP Scheme
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: Let Gq denote a subgroup of Zp with prime order q and g, h1, h2,
. . . , hn be generators of Gq, where p = 2q+1 is also prime. Choose two collision
resistant hash functions H,H1 such that H : N→ Z∗q and H1 : Gq → Gq. The
system parameters params = (Gq, p, q, g, h1, h2, . . . , hn, H,H1).
2. KeyGen: The receiver R chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and generates
a retrievable key pair (rpk, rsk) = (gs, s). R chooses k random numbers
s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈R Zq and computes S1 = gs1 , S2 = gs2 , . . . , Sk = gsk . S chooses a
random number z ∈R Z∗q and generates a one-time key pair (opk, osk) = (gz, z).
R publishes rpk and S1, S2, . . . , Sk and S publishes opk.
3. Commitment Phase: S computes the ciphertext of m1,m2, . . . ,mn as ci =
H1((rpk · hH(i)i )z) ·mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S sends c1, c2, . . . , cn to R.
4. Request: In the i-th round,
• R chooses ri ∈R Z∗q, and computesBi = gri , B′i = hriαi andAi = (g
ri)s(hriαi)
H(αi),
where αi ∈R {1, 2, . . . , n} is the receiver’s choice and f(Bi) = s + s1Bi +
. . .+ skB
k
i .
• R sends (Bi, B′i, f(Bi), Ai) to S, and simultaneously does the following proof
of knowledge. PoK{(H(αi), s) : A = BsiB′i
H(αi) ∧ rpk = gs}.
5. Response: S first verifies Bi, the secret share f(Bi) and the PoK by checking:
• S checks whether Bi appears in previous session.
• gf(Bi) ?= rpk · SBi1 · S
B2i
2 · . . . · S
Bki
k . If this equation holds,
• S verifies PoK{(H(αi), s) : Ai = BsiB′i
H(αi) ∧ rpk = gs}.
If either of the verification fails, S aborts; Otherwise, S stores (Bi, B
′
i, f(Bi),
Ai) and S generates Di = A
z
i and sends Di to R.
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6. Extract: Upon receiving Di from S, R computes Kαi = D
1
ri
i and extracts the
intended message mαi = cαi/H1(Kαi).
7. Reveal: Once R and S execute the OT for k+ 1 times, S obtains k+ 1 shares
of the secret. S is able to recover s from secret sharing. Once s is calculated,
for the previous commitments Ai = B
s
iB
′
i
H(αi), given Bi, B
′
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. S
is able to retrieve αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The proof of knowledge PoK{(H(αi), s) : Ai = BsiB′i
H(αi) ∧ rpk = gs} can be
implemented as follows:
1. R randomly chooses two random numbers t1, t2 ∈ Zp, computes T1 = Bt1i B′i
t2 ,
T2 = g
t1 , c = H(f(Bi), Bi, B
′
i, T1, T2), v1 = t1 − cs and v2 = t2 − cH(αi). R
sends v1, v2, T1, T2 to S.
2. S accepts if both AciB
v1
i B
′
i
v2 = T1 and rpk
cgv1 = T2 hold.
8.4.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 8.1. The proposed OTRRP scheme is correct.
Proof. The correctness checks of the proposed scheme are as follows:
1. Correctness of PoK: If R is honest, then R has knowledge of H(αi) and s,
R computes v1 = t1 − cs and v2 = t2 − cH(αi). S can verify correctly that:
AciB
v1
i B
′
i
v2 = Bsci B
′
i
H(αi)cBt1−csi B
′
i
t2−cH(αi) = Bt1i B
′
i
t2 = T1.
and
rpkcgv1 = gscgt1−cs = gt1 = T2.
2. Correctness of extracting the message:
mαi =
cαi
H1(Kαi)
=
mαiH1(rpk · h
H(αi)
αi )
z)
H1((griszh
riH(αi)z
αi )
1
ri )
=
mαiH1(g
szh
H(αi)z
αi )
H1(gszh
H(αi)z
αi )
= mαi
Theorem 8.2. The proposed OTRRP scheme provides receiver’s privacy for honest
receivers.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver runs the OT protocol with the sender for k times.
The sender could obtain k pairs of transcripts {(A1, B1, B′1), (A2, B2, B′2), . . . , (Ak,
Bk, B
′
k)} such that A1 = (gr1)s(hr1α1)
H(α1), A2 = (g
r2)s(hr2α2)
H(α2), . . . , Ak = (g
rk)s(hrkαk
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)H(αk), where α1, α2, . . . , αk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are the user’s choice and r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈R
Z∗q. Given Bj = grj , rpk = gs for some random rj ∈ Z∗q, it is computation-infeasible
to decide the masked value equals grjs or a random value Z in Gq, thus for any two
transcripts Aj and Ai such that 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k from the user, they are computation-
ally indistinguishable to the service provider as long as the DDH problem is hard in
Gq.
Claim 1. The proposed encryption scheme is semantic secure.
Proof. The security proof is performed using random oracle. Suppose the simulator
B maintains a table T1 for the hash queries. B obtains n+ 1 values Z, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn
from the challenge oracle C(·). B sets the one-time public key of the sender opk = Z
and sends Z, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn to a PPT adversary A. Assume A queries on a mes-
sage mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. B first obtain the diffie-hellman value of (Z, Yi) with
help of DH(·) oracle. Then A checks if DH(Z, Yi) has existed in T1. If not, B
chooses a new random Zi ∈ Gq and stores (DH(Z, Yi), Zi) to T1. Otherwise, assume
H1(DH(Z, Yi)) = Zi, B returns ci = Zi ·mi as the ciphertext on mi. After n − 1
queries, A sends two challenge messages m∗0,m∗1, B chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and a random
number Zn ∈ Gq. A sets the ciphertext c∗b on m∗b as c∗b = Zn · m∗b . If A has a
non-negligible probability ε in distinguishing c∗b than random guess. Then with an
overwhelming probability that DH(Z, Yn) has been submitted in the hash queries.
Thus B breaks the OMDH assumption, we reach a contradiction. Therefore the
proposed encryption scheme is semantic secure.
Theorem 8.3. The proposed OTRRP scheme provides sender’s privacy.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver runs the OT protocol with the sender k times.
For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂ in the real-world model,
we are able to construct a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂∗ in the
ideal model such that the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
Briefly, the ideal-world cheating receiver R̂∗ can extract α from the proof of
knowledge. This enables him to obtain the message mα form the TTP . R̂
∗ simulates
the honest sender S in the real-world and interacts with R̂ as follows:
1. S sends m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the trusted third party TTP .
2. R̂∗ sends c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n to TTP such that c
∗
i ∈R Gq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. R̂∗ monitors the outputs Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαk of R̂, R̂
∗ chooses A∗α1 , A
∗
α2
, . . . ,
A∗αk ∈R Gq.
4. After R̂ runs Request protocol, if the verification of PoK fails, R̂∗ sends a value
αi /∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} to TTP.
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5. If the verification of PoK successes, R̂∗ extracts R̂’s choice αi from the PoK
and gets back D∗σ1 , D
∗
σ2
, . . . , D∗σk such that D
∗
σi
= Az
∗
αi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
6. If R̂ can compute Kαi = g
szh
H(αi)z
αi , R̂
∗ sends αi to TTP , TTP returns
c∗αi
mαi
.
7. R̂∗ outputs (A∗α1 , A
∗
α2
, . . . , A∗αk , D
∗
σ1
, D∗σ2 , . . . , D
∗
σk
, c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n).
We can see from Theorem 8.2 and Claim 1 that {Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαk} and {c1, c2, . . . ,
cn} are indistinguishable from random elements in Gq. In addition, the sets of
{Dσ1 , Dσ2 , . . . , Dσk} and {D∗σ1 , D
∗
σ2
, . . . , D∗σk} are identically distributed. Therefore,
no distinguishers can distinguish the outputs of R̂ and R̂′ with a non-negligible
probability.
Theorem 8.4. The proposed OTRRP provides retrievable privacy for the receiver.
Proof. After running the protocol k + 1 times with the receiver, the sender obtains
k + 1 shares of the retrievable private key s with respect to the unknown integers
s1, s2, . . . , sk such that
f(Bi) = s+ s1Bi + s2B
2
i . . .+ skB
k
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
The corresponding linear equations in a matrix form are as follows:

1 B1 B
2
1 · · · Bk1
1 B2 B
2
2 · · · Bk2
...
...
...
...
...
1 Bk+1 B
2
k+1 · · · Bkk+1
 *

s
s1
...
sk
=

f(B1)
f(B2)
...
f(Bk+1)

As we can see the coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix or a non-singular
matrix. The determinant of such a matrix is not equal to zero. Thus the equations
have a unique solution to s, s1, s2, . . . , sk.
Once the sender obtains the value of the retrievable private key rsk. For previous
commitments on receiver’s choice Ai = B
rsk
i B
′
i
H(αi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since S has store
the values of Bi and B
′
i in the i-th round. Thus, the sender could trace the receiver
choice αi = j in the i-th round by checking that Ai = B
rsk
i B
′
i
H(αi) = Brski B
′
i
H(j) for
1 ≤ j ≤ n.
8.5 Our Second Scheme and Security Analysis
In this section, we propose another oblivious transfer scheme with retrievable re-
ceiver’s privacy which we will use together with a blind signature scheme to construct
our second e-coupon systems in next chapter.
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8.5.1 The Second Proposed OTRRP Scheme
The proposed oblivious transfer scheme consists a tuple of PPT algorithms as fol-
lows:
1. Setup: On input a security parameter κ ∈ N, a trusted third party generates
the system parameters params = (Gq, g, h, p, q,H), where Gq is the subgroup
of Zp with prime order q and p = 2q + 1 is also prime, g, h are generators of
Gq. H : {0, 1}∗ → Gq is a collision resistant hash function.
2. KeyGen: A user U chooses a random number x ∈ Z∗q and sets the key pair
(rpk, rsk) = (gx, x). U chooses k random numbers s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈R Zq and
computes S1 = g
s1 , S2 = g
s2 , . . . , Sk = g
sk . U publishes rpk and S1, S2, . . . , Sk.
The service provider S randomly chooses y ∈ Z∗q and sets the public key as
pk = gy.
3. Request: In the i-th round,
• R chooses ri ∈R Z∗q, and computes Bi = gri and Ai = Bxi hαi where αi is its
choice, and f(Bi) = x+ s1Bi + . . . skB
k
i .
• R sends (Bi, f(Bi), Ai) to S, and simultaneously does the following PoK:
PoK{(αi, s) : Ai = Bxi hαi ∧ rpk = gs}.
4. Response: S first verifies Bi, the secret share f(Bi) and the PoK by checking:
• Bi has not been used in a previous session;
• gf(Bi) = rpk · SBi1 · S
B2i
2 · . . . · S
Bki
k ; and
• PoK{(α, x) : Ai = Bxi hαi ∧ rpk = gx} is valid.
If any verification fails, S aborts; otherwise, S stores (Bi, f(Bi), Ai) and
• generates ci = ((rpk)ki ,mi(Ai/hi)ki) where ki ∈R Zq, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and
• sends (c1, c2, . . . , cn) to R.
Then R can obtain mαi = mαi(Ai/h
αi)kαi/((rpk)kαi )ri .
5. Reveal: Once R and S execute the OT for k + 1 times, S obtains k + 1
shares of the secret x. Then S is able to calculate x, and retrieve hαi from
Ai = B
x
i h
αi .
The proof of knowledge PoK{(αi, x) : Ai = Bxi hαi ∧ rpk = gx} can be done non-
interactively as follows:
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1. R randomly chooses two random numbers t1, t2 ∈ Zp, computes T1 = Bt1i ht2 , T2
= gt1 , c′i = H(f(Bi), Bi, T1, T2), s
′
1 = t1 − c′ix and s′2 = t2 − c′iαi. R sends
s′1, s
′
2, T1, T2 to S.
2. S accepts if both A
c′i
i B
s′1
i h
s′2 = T1 and rpk
c′igs
′
1 = T2 hold.
8.5.2 Security Analysis
We analyze the security of the proposed oblivious transfer scheme under half-simulation
model [NP05].
Theorem 8.5. The proposed OTRRP scheme is correct.
Proof. The correctness checks of the proposed scheme are as follows.
1. Correctness of PoK:
A
c′i
i B
s′1
i h
s′2 = B
xc′i
2 h
αic
′
iB
t1−c′ix
i h
t2−c′iαi = Bt1i h
ti = T1.
and
rpkc
′
gs
′
1 = gxc
′
gt1−c
′x = gt1 = T2.
2. Correctness of Extracting the Message:
mαi(Aαi/h
αi)kαi/(rpk)kαirαi
= (Bxαih
αi/hαi)kαi/(rpk)kαirαi
= mαig
xrαikαi/gxrαikαi
= mαi
Theorem 8.6. The proposed OTRRP scheme provides receiver’s privacy for honest
receivers.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver runs the OT protocol with the sender for k times.
The sender could obtain k pairs of transcripts {(A1, B1, f(B1)), (A2, B2, f(B2)), . . . ,
(Ak, Bk, f(Bk))} such that A1 = gr1xhα1 , A2 = gr2xhα2 , . . . , Ak = grkxhαk , where
α1, α2, . . . , αk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are the user’s choice and r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈R Z∗q. Given
Bj = g
rj , rpk = gx for some random rj ∈ Z∗q, it is computation-infeasible to decide
the masked value equals grjx or a random value Z in Gq, thus for any two transcripts
Aj and Ai such that 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k from the user, they are computationally
indistinguishable to the service provider as long as the DDH problem is hard in Gq.
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Claim 2. The proposed encryption scheme is semantic secure.
Proof. As can be seen in the proposed OT scheme, the cipertext is ci = ((rpk)
ki ,mi
(Ai/h
i)ki) where ki ∈R Zq, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The proposed encryption scheme in our
OT scheme is a variant of ElGamal encryption. Therefore the encryption scheme is
semantic secure.
Theorem 8.7. The proposed OTRRP scheme provides sender’s privacy.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver runs the OT protocol with the sender k times.
For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂ in the real-world model,
we are able to construct a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂∗ in the
ideal model such that the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
Briefly, the ideal-world cheating receiver R̂∗ can extract α from the proof of
knowledge. This enables him to obtain the message mα form the TTP . R̂
∗ simulates
the honest sender S in the real-world and interacts with R̂ as follows:
1. S sends m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the trusted third party TTP .
2. R̂∗ sends c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n to TTP such that c
∗
i ∈R Gq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. R̂∗ monitors the outputs Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαk of R̂, R̂
∗ chooses A∗α1 , A
∗
α2
, . . . , A∗αk
∈R Gq.
4. After R̂ runs Request protocol, if the verification of PoK fails, R̂∗ sends a value
αi /∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} to TTP.
5. If the verification of PoK successes, R̂∗ extracts R̂’s choice αi from the PoK
and gets back c∗σ1 , c
∗
σ2
, . . . , c∗σk such that c
∗
σi
∈R Gq for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
6. If R̂ can compute gxrαi , R̂∗ sends αi to TTP , TTP returns
c∗αi,2
mαi
.
7. R̂∗ outputs (A∗α1 , A
∗
α2
, . . . , A∗αk ; c
∗
1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n).
We can see from Theorem 8.6 and Claim 2 that {Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαk} and {c1, c2, . . . , cn}
are indistinguishable from random elements in Gq. Therefore, no distinguishers can
distinguish the outputs of R̂ and R̂′ with a non-negligible probability.
Theorem 8.8. The proposed OTRRP provides retrievable privacy for the receiver.
Proof. The security proof is similar to that in Theorem 8.4. Thus we omit it.
CHAPTER 8. NOVEL OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER SCHEMES 88
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two novel oblivious transfer schemes that can achieve
retrievable receiver’s privacy without the help of a trusted third party. The mis-
behaving receivers’ choices could be traced while the honest receivers’ privacy is
unconditionally protected. We also proved the security of the schemes under the
proposed security model.
Chapter 9
Two E-Coupon Systems with Strong
User Privacy
In this chapter, we propose another two e-coupon system allowing multiple use of
an e-coupon. To be specific, the propose e-coupon systems can achieve the following
properties:
1. The coupon issuer (or service provider) can trace the identity of a dishonest
user while the identity privacy (or anonymity) of an honest user is still well
protected.
2. An honest user’s redemption privacy (i.e., the items chosen when redeeming
an e-coupon) is well protected from the service provider.
3. If a dishonest user redeems an e-coupon for more than the pre-determined
number of times, then the user will lose the redemption privacy (i.e., all the
choices the user has made in the previous redemptions can be revealed).
Our first e-coupon system achieves the first two properties without the involvement
of any trusted third party. Then we use a novel oblivious transfer scheme proposed
in the previous chapter to construct the second e-coupon system that can achieve
all the properties given above. Compared with the e-coupon system in Chapter 7,
two major improvements have been made in the proposed e-coupon systems. First,
the proposed e-coupon systems allow an honest user to redeem a valid coupon for a
fix number of times (more than twice). Besides, the adoption of an OTRRP scheme
in the second scheme makes it possible to trace the choices of the dishonest users
in addition to their identities. We define the formal security models for these new
security requirements, and show that our new e-coupon systems are proven secure
in the proposed models.
9.1 Introduction
We have constructed a new e-coupon system with new properties in Chapter 7.
The proposed e-coupon system can ensure desired security properties such as un-
forgeability, anonymity, double-redemption detection and user privacy (redemption
privacy). However, it only permits an honest user to spend a valid coupon twice,
which might limit its usage in practice. In addition, another interesting feature
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that has not been considered in our previous e-coupon system is traceability against
user’s choice (redemption privacy). That is, if a user is detected as a malicious user,
then all the previous choices related to his coupon could be traced by the coupon
issuer.
Though some existing e-coupon systems [CES+05, Ngu06b, CGH06] have al-
ready supported multiple use of an electronic coupon, the new properties of re-
demption privacy and traceability have not been considered in these systems. Chen
et al.’s e-coupon system [CES+05] allows a user to redeem a coupon for a predefined
number of times. Their system can provide unlinkability among different redemp-
tions performed by a user using the same multi-coupon. Meanwhile, the number of
remaining redemptions can also be hidden from the coupon issuer. To reduce the
cost for issuing and redeeming coupons, Nguyen [Ngu06b] later presented another
more efficient e-coupon system which has constant communication and computation
costs. Nguyen’s e-coupon system provides another interesting feature named revo-
cability, which allows the coupon issuer to revoke (i.e., terminate) an e-coupon. In
an independent work [CGH06], Canard et al. also proposed another multi-coupon
system with a different feature: a coupon holder can transfer some values in his/her
multi-coupon to another user.
Our Contributions. In this chapter, we propose two new e-coupon systems, which
are based on a blind signature scheme and a new OT scheme. Our first e-coupon
system can achieve unforgeability, anonymity for honest users, k-time redemption
detection, traceability against dishonest users’ identities, and user privacy. The user
privacy in our first e-coupon system is achieved by employing an normal OT scheme
in the redemption phase.
In order to trace the items redeemed by a dishonest user, we apply a novel OT
scheme proposed in last chapter which has the following properties:
1. The privacy (i.e., choices) of an honest receiver is well protected against the
sender.
2. The receiver cannot gain any information other than his choice during the OT
protocol.
3. If the receiver runs the OT protocol for more than the pre-determined number
of times, then all the previous choices made by the receiver can be revealed by
the sender.
As we will show later, our OT scheme incurs very little computation and communi-
cation overhead in order to achieve the third (new) property. We then use the new
OT scheme to construct the second e-coupon system which allows both the identity
and the choices of a dishonest user to be revealed.
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Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We provide some definitions in Section 9.2. The formal security models for our
e-coupon systems are presented in Section 9.3. We then present our first construc-
tion with security analysis in Section 9.4. The second construction and its security
analysis are presented in Section 9.5. We compare our e-coupon systems with ex-
isting systems and analyze the efficiency of them in section 9.6 and this chapter is
concluded in Section 9.7.
9.2 Formal Definition
We present the formal definition of our e-coupon system in this section. An e-coupon
system involves two participants, namely, a user U and a coupon issuer S, which is
also a service provider. An e-coupon system consists of a tuple of non-interactive or
interactive probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: On input of a security parameter κ, a trusted third party runs the
setup algorithm and generates the system parameters.
params← Setup(1κ).
2. KeyGen: On input of the public parameter params, the key generation algo-
rithm outputs a key pair for a user or a service provider. It is worth noticing
that we assume a public key infrastructure (PKI) binding the public key to
user’s identity in our system.
(pkU ,skU ), (pkS , skS)← KeyGen(params).
3. Issue: The issue algorithm is an interactive protocol between the service
provider S and a user U , the output is an e-coupon for the user.
C ← Issue(S(pkS , skS , params),U(pkU , params)).
4. Redeem: The redeem algorithm is an interactive protocol between a user
U and the service provider S, taking as input an e-coupon C, the public
key pkS of the service provider and the public parameters params. Suppose
(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) is a set of goods or services possessed by S, where n is the
number of services decided by S. The output of this algorithm for the service
provider is accept or reject.
‘accept’ or ‘reject’← RedeemS(pkS , params,C).
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The output of this algorithm for the user is the service mi of his choice or a
failure symbol.
‘⊥’ or mi ← RedeemU(pkS , params,C).
5. Reveal: The reveal algorithm is executed by the service provider, taking a se-
quence of the challenge-response pairs and the corresponding redeemed coupon
{(c1, R1), (c2, R2), . . . , (ck+1, Rk+1);C} and the public parameters params as
input, and outputs the identity IDU of a user or a failure symbol ‘⊥’.
IDU or ‘⊥’← Reveal((c1, R1), (c2, R2), . . . , (ck+1, Rk+1), C, params).
If the e-coupon system also supports traceability of items against dishonest
users, then the reveal algorithm returns (IDU , {m1,m2, . . . ,mk+1}) or ‘⊥’.
Correctness: We require that for any security parameter κ ∈ N, if params ←
Setup(1κ), (pkU , skU) ← KeyGen(params), (pkS , skS) ← KeyGen(params),
C ← Issue(S(pkS , skS),U(pkU , params)), then
•
Pr(‘accept’← RedeemS(pkS , params,C, (c, R))) = 1
and
Pr(itemi ← RedeemU(pkS , params,C, (c, R))) = 1.
• If the user redeems the coupon for at most k times, then the service provider
cannot obtain any private information about the user.
Pr(‘ ⊥ ’← Reveal((c1, R1), (c2, R2), . . . , (cδ, Rδ);C; params)| δ ≤ k) = 1.
• If the user redeems the coupon more than k times, then the service provider can
trace the identity (and all the choices, if supported) of the user.
Pr(IDU ← Reveal((c1, R1), (c2, R2), . . . , (cδ, Rδ);C; params)|k < δ) = 1
or
Pr((IDU , {m1,m2, . . . ,mδ})← Reveal((c1, R1), (c2, R2), . . . , (cδ, Rδ);C;
params)| k < δ) = 1.
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9.3 Security Model
We formalize four security requirements for our e-coupon system, that are unforge-
ability, user anonymity, k-time redemption detection, and user privacy.
Unforgeability
The adversarial game of unforgeability is same as that in Section 7.3, thus we omit
it. Define the advantage of a adversary A in winning the unforgeability game as
AdvunfA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]
Definition 9.1. An e-coupon system is said to be unforgeable if AdvunfA (κ) is neg-
ligible for any PPT adversary A.
Anonymity
The adversarial game regarding anonymity is same as that in Section 7.3, thus we
omit it. Define the advantage of a adversary A in winning the game as
AdvAnoA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]−
1
2
Definition 9.2. An e-coupon system is said to provide anonymity if AdvAnoA (k) is
negligible for any PPT adversary A.
k-time Redemption Detection
Detection of over spending is a major concern for any digital coupon system. An
e-coupon system is said to provide k-time redemption detection if one user cannot
redeem one coupon more than pre-determined number of times with the same service
provider without being caught.The adversarial game for k-time redemption detection
is defined as follows:
1. Setup: The simulator B runs algorithm Setup to generate public parameters
params.
2. KeyGen: The simulator B generates two key pairs (pkU , skU) and (pkS , skS),
B sends (pkU , skU) and pkS to A.
3. Issue queries: Assume A makes qd coupon issuing queries. S runs the Issue
algorithm with A to issue a sequence of coupons {C1, C2, . . . , Cqd} for A.
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4. Redeem queries: A runs the redeem protocol with S with any coupon of his
choice.
5. Challenge: A outputs a sequence (C∗, (c∗1, R∗1), (c∗2, R∗2), . . . , (c∗δ , R∗δ)) such
that k < δ. We say A wins the game if
• RedeemS(pkS , params,C∗, (c∗i , R∗i )) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ δ.
• ‘⊥’←Reveal((c∗1, R∗1), (c∗2, R∗2), . . . , (c∗δ , R∗δ), C∗, params)
Define the advantage of A in winning the adversarial game above as
AdvkrdA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]
Definition 9.3. An e-coupon system is said to provide k-time redemption detection
if AdvkrdA (κ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
User privacy
The adversarial game regarding user privacy is same as that in Section 7.3, thus we
omit it. Define the success probability of the adversary A in breaking users’ privacy
as
AdvupA (κ) = Pr[A wins the game]−
1
n
Definition 9.4. An e-coupon system is said to provide user privacy if AdvupA (κ) is
negligible for any PPT adversary A.
9.4 Our First Privacy-preserving E-coupon Sys-
tem
We apply a blind signature scheme that involves a challenge-response verification
to ensure that if a coupon is redeemed more than pre-determined number of times
then the identity of the misbehaving user could be traced. We combine the proposed
blind signature with the oblivious transfer scheme in [CT05] to construct the first
e-coupon system with user privacy.
9.4.1 PPE-COUPON-I
We denote in our system the service provider by S and a user by U . Denote
{m1,m2, . . . ,mn} the set of items that can be redeemed. A user with a valid coupon
is allowed to make k < n choices from them. The detailed description of our e-coupon
system is as follows.
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1. Setup: On input of a security parameter κ ∈ N, a trusted party generates the
system parameters params = (Gq, g, p, q,H1, H2), where Gq is the subgroup
of Zp with prime order q and g is a generator of Gq, where p = 2q + 1 is also
prime. H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Gq and H2 : Gq → {0, 1}κ are two collision-resistant
hash functions.
2. KeyGen: A user U chooses a random number x ∈ Z∗q and sets the key pair
(pkU , skU). U publishes pkU = gx and keeps skU = x secret. The service
provider S randomly chooses y ∈ Z∗q and sets the public key as pkS = Y = gy.
3. Issue: The issue protocol is performed by interactive communications though
a secure channel between the service provider S and a user U . The result of
the issue protocol is that S generates a valid coupon for a user U . We assume
there exists a PKI binding the public keys to the identities of users in the
system.
• On receiving a request from U , S chooses a random number k′ ∈R Z∗q and
computes δ1 ← pkk
′
U and δ2 ← gk
′
sends (δ1, δ2) to U
• After receiving (δ1, δ2) from S, U checks whether δ1 = δskU2 . If the verification
fails, U stops; otherwise, U chooses x1 ∈ Z∗q and computes α ← (gxy)x1 ,
β ← (gx)x1 , λ = gx1 and m← H1(α, β, λ). U chooses two different random
number a, b ∈ Z∗q and computes r ← mβaδ
bx1
a
1 and m
′ ← aH1(m,r)
b
, U sends
m′ to S.
• S computes s′ = m′y + k′ and sends s′ to U .
• U verifies if gs′ ≡ Y m′δ2 mod p, if the equation holds, U removes the blind
factor b by calculating s = s
′b
a
+ a; otherwise, abort. U stores (α, β, λ, r, s)
and the secret x1 in a safe place (i.e. tamper proof memory).
4. Redeem: At the start of the redeem phase, U chooses k random numbers
s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈R Zq and computes S1 = gs1 , S2 = gs2 , . . . , Sk = gsk . U
sends S1, S2, . . . , Sk to the service provider S. S stores these commitments
S1, S2, . . . , Sk. In the i-th round, the redeem protocol is performed as follows:
• After receiving a redeem request from the user, S generates a challenge
ci = H1(IDS ||Date||Time) and sends ci to U , where IDS is the identity of
the service provider.
• After receiving the challenge ci from the service provider and U computes
Ri = x1 + s1ci + s2c
2
i + . . . + skc
k
i and choose σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, where σi
is the index of the service, and a random number bi ∈ Z∗q, U computes
wσi = H1(σi) and Aσi = wσig
bi . U sends (ci, Ri, α, β, λ, r, s) and Aσi to S.
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• S checks if
– (ci, Ri) has appeared in a previous session.
– H1(α, β, λ)
?
= β−sαH1(H1(α,β,λ),r)r.
– gRi
?
= λSci1 S
c2i
2 . . . S
cki
k .
If either of the check fails, abort; Otherwise, S computes Dσi = Aiy, wj =
H1(i) and cj = mi ⊕H2(wyi ), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. S sends Dσi and c1, c2, . . . , cn
to U .
• U computes Kσi = Dσi/Y bi and recover mσi = cσi ⊕H2(Kσi).
5. Reveal: Assume the coupon C = (α, β, λ, r, s) is redeemed by a dishonest
user U ′ for k+ 1 times, S could obtain k+ 1 shares about the secret x1. Once
S obtains the value of x1, S could trace the identity of U ′ by making an ex-
haustive search in his database to determine the public key of the misbehaving
user such that pkU ′
x1 = β.
6. Correctness: The correctness check for validity of the coupon is as follows:
β−sαH1(H1(α,β,λ),r)r
= (pkx1U )
−s(gxyx1)rr
= (pkx1U )
−H1(H1(α,β,λ),r)y− k
′b
a
−a(pkx1U )
H1(H1(α,β,λ),r)y
m(pkx1U )
a(pkx1U )
k′b
a
= m
= H1(α, β, λ)
The correctness check for a user U to recover the correct message is as follows:
cσi ⊕H2(Kσi)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2(A
y
σi
/Y bi)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2((wσig
bi)y/Y bi)
= mσi ⊕H2(wyσi)⊕H2((wσi)
y)
= mσi
9.4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove the security of PPE-COUPON-I under the proposed secu-
rity models.
Theorem 9.1. The proposed PPE-COUPON-I system is unforgeable.
CHAPTER 9. TWO NOVEL E-COUPON SYSTEMS 97
Proof. The security analysis is similar as that in theorem 7.1, thus we omit it.
Theorem 9.2. The proposed PPE-COUPON-I system provides anonymity.
Proof. The security analysis is similar as that in 7.2, thus we omit it.
Theorem 9.3. The proposed PPE-COUPON-I system provides k-time redemption
detection.
Proof. According to our e-coupon system, if U has redeemed a coupon (α, β, λ, r, s)
for k + 1 times, then B obtains k + 1 different challenge-response pairs
(c1, R1), (c2, R2) . . . , (ck+1, Rk+1) where
Ri = x1 + s1ci + s2c
2
i . . .+ skc
k
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
We can represent these linear equations in the matrix form as follows:

1 c1 c
2
1 · · · ck1
1 c2 c
2
2 · · · ck2
...
...
...
...
...
1 ck+1 c
2
k+1 · · · ckk+1
 *

x1
s1
...
sk
=

R1
R2
...
Rk+1

Since the challenges c1, c2, . . . , ck+1 are random integers, the coefficient matrix is a
Vandermonde matrix. Thus the equations have a unique solution for x1, s1, s2, . . . ,
sk. Once x1 is calculated by S, S could trace the identity of the misbehaving user
U ′ by making an exhaustive search in his database to determine the public key of
the misbehaving user such that pkU ′
x1 = β.
It remains to show that the public key revealed in such a method is the correct public
key of the misbehaving user. The proof is straightforward. Since the coupon issuer
has specified the public key pkU ′ in the pair (δ1, δ2). Only the user U ′ possessing the
corresponding private key skU ′ can obtain a valid coupon (A cheating user without
knowledge of skU ′ can not compute the component α of a coupon). In this way, it
can be ensured that a public key revealed through this method is indeed the public
key of the misbehaving user.
Theorem 9.4. The proposed PPE-COUPON-I system provides unconditional user
privacy.
Proof. The security analysis regarding user privacy is similar as that in theorem 7.4,
thus we omit it.
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9.5 Our Second Privacy-Preserving E-coupon Sys-
tem
We construct the second e-coupon system that can achieve traceability against a
misbehaving user’s choices in addition to all the security properties mentioned above.
Since the user’s privacy relies on oblivious transfer in our construction, in order to
reveal a misbehaving user’s privacy, we apply one of the new OT schemes with
retrievable receiver’s privacy proposed in last chapter.
9.5.1 PP-ECOUPON-II
We combine the proposed blind signature and oblivious transfer schemes to construct
the second e-coupon system that can achieve all the desirable properties.
1. Setup: On input a security parameter κ ∈ N, a trusted third party generate
the system parameters paras = (Gq, g, h, p, q,H1), where Gq is the subgroup
of Zp with prime order q and p = 2q + 1 is also prime, g, h are generators of
Gq, and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Gq is a collision-resistant hash function.
2. KeyGen: On input a security parameter κ ∈ N and the public parameter
params, randomly choose x, y ∈R Z∗q and calculate gx, gy and output the
private and public key pairs (skU = x, pkU = g
x) and (skS = y, pkS = Y = g
y)
for the user and service provider respectively.
3. Issue: The issue protocol is performed through interactive communications
between the service provider S and a user U . The result of the issue protocol
is that S generates a valid coupon for a user U .
• On receiving a request from U , S chooses a random number k′ ∈R Z∗q and
computes δ1 ← pkk
′
U and δ2 ← gk
′
sends (δ1, δ2) to U .
• After receiving (δ1, δ2) from S, U checks whether δ1 = δskU2 . If the verification
fails, U stops; otherwise, U chooses x1 ∈ Z∗p and computes α ← (gxy)
x1 ,
β ← (gx)x1 and λ = gx1 , m← H1(α, β, λ). U chooses two different random
number a, b and computes r ← mβaδ
bx1
a
1 and m
′ ← aH1(m,r)
b
, U sends m′ to
S.
• S computes the signature s′ = m′y+k′ on the blinded message m′ and sends
s′ to U .
• U verifies if gs′ ≡ Y m′δ2 mod p, if the equation holds, U removes the blind
factor b by calculating s = s
′b
a
+ a. Otherwise, abort. U stores (α, β, λ, r, s)
and x1 in a safe place (i.e. tamper proof memory);
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4. Redeem: U chooses k random number s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈R Gq and computes
S1 = g
s1 , S2 = g
s2 , . . . , Sk = g
sk . U sends S1, S2, . . . , Sk to S at the start of the
redeem phase. S stores these commitments S1, S2, . . . , Sk. In the i-th round,
the redeem protocol is performed as follows:
• After receiving a redeem request from the user, S generates a challenge
ci = H1(IDS ||Date||Time) and sends ci to U .
• After receiving ci, U computes Ri = x1 + s1ci + s2c2i + . . .+ skcki and chooses
αi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and a random number rαi ∈ Z∗q, U computes Bi = grαi
and Ai = B
x1
i h
αi . U sends (ci, Ri, α, β, λ, r, s) and (Ai, Bi) to S.
• S checks if
– Ri has not been used in a previous session.
– H1(α, β, λ) = β
−sαH1(H1(α,β,λ),r)r.
– gRi = λSci1 S
c2i
2 . . . S
cki
k .
– The proof of knowledge PoK{(x1, αi) : Ai = Bx1i hαi ∧ λ = gx1} is valid.
If any of the checks fails, aborts; otherwise, S chooses n different random
number k1, k2, . . . , kn
∈R Z∗q and computes ci = (ci,1, ci,2) = (λki ,mi·(Ai/hi)ki). S sends c1, c2, . . . , cn
to U .
• U extracts the intended message mαi = cαi,2/c
rαi
αi,1
.
5. Reveal: Assume the coupon C = (α, β, λ, r, s) is redeemed by a dishonest
user U ′ for k + 1 times, the S could obtain k + 1 shares about the secret x1.
Once S obtains the value of x1,
• S could trace the identity of U ′ by making an exhaustive search in his
database to determine the public key of the misbehaving user such that
pkU ′
x1 = β.
• For all the previous transcriptsBx11 hα1 , Bx12 hα2 , . . . , Bx1k hαk , givenB1, B2, . . . ,
Bk, then all the previous choice α1, α2, . . . , αk could also be decided.
6. Correctness:
• The correctness check for validity of the coupon is same as that in PPE-
COUPON-I.
• The correctness check for a user U to extract the correct message is as
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follows:
mαi
= cαi,2/c
rαi
αi,1
= mαi(Ai/h
αi)kαi/(λkαi )rαi
= mαi(B
x1
i h
αi/hαi)kαi/(gx1kαi )rαi
= mαig
rαix1kαi/gx1kαirαi
= mαi
9.5.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 9.5. The proposed PPE-COUPON-II system is unforgeable.
Proof. The security proof for unforgeability is same as the security proof for PP-
COUPON-I.
Theorem 9.6. The proposed PPE-COUPON-II system provides anonymity.
Proof. The security proof for anonymity is same as the security proof for PP-
COUPON-I.
Theorem 9.7. The proposed PPE-COUPON-II system provides k-time redemption
detection.
Proof. The security proof for anonymity is same as the security proof for PP-
COUPON-I.
Theorem 9.8. The proposed PPE-COUPON-II system provides user privacy for
honest users.
Proof. For the transcripts received by the service provider A1 = (g
r1)x1hα2 , A2 =
(gr2)x1hα2 , . . . , Ak = (g
rk)x1hαk , where α1, α2, . . . , αk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are the user’s
choice and r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈R Z∗q. Given Bj = grj , λ = gx1 for some random rj ∈ Z∗q,
it is computation-infeasible to decide the masked value Aj equals g
rjx1 or a random
value Z in Gq, thus for any two transcripts Aj and Ai such that 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k from
the user, they are computationally indistinguishable to the service provider as long
as the DDH problem is hard in Gq.
Theorem 9.9. The proposed e-coupon system provides retrievable user privacy for
dishonest users.
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Proof. As we have demonstrated in previous security proof, once a malicious user U ′
tried to redeem a coupon for k + 1 times, then the service provider can reconstruct
the secret x1. For all the previous choice of U ′, given the transcripts Aj = Bx1j hαj
and Bj = g
rj where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, once x1 be revealed, each αj could also be decided.
In order to increase the computation speed, the service provider could pre-compute
the set {h1, h2, . . . , hn}.
9.6 Efficiency Analysis
We compare the proposed e-coupon systems with existing e-coupon systems in the
literature in terms of computation efficiency and security properties.
Comparison in terms of Security Properties
We can see in Table 9.1 that our e-coupon systems provide traceability and privacy of
purchase, which have not been considered in previous e-coupons systems. However,
our e-coupon systems only achieves anonymity, which is weaker than unlinkability
in [CES+05, Ngu06b]. We leave the construction of e-coupon systems with both
traceability and unlinkability as future work. In order to save space, in Table 9.1,
the abbreviations ‘DM’ denotes ‘Detection of Misuse’ while ‘PP’ is short for ‘Privacy
of Purchase’.
Table 9.1: Comparison with Other E-Coupon Systems in terms of Security
Properties
Scheme Security Properties
Unforgeability DM Anonymity PP Traceability
Scheme 1 [CES+05]
√ √
strong × ×
Scheme 2 [Ngu06b]
√ √
strong × ×
PPE-COUPON-I
√ √
weak
√ √
PPE-COUPON-II
√ √
weak
√ √
Efficiency Analysis
We present a detailed analysis regarding the computation efficiency of our e-coupon
systems and present the comparison with existing e-coupons systems in Table 9.2. In
the table, E represents an exponentiation operation, P refers to a pairing operation;
n is the number of goods or services from the service provider and k is the number of
choices that could be made by a user. From the efficiency analysis, we can see that
the computation cost of our e-coupon systems is quite low. Specially, our second
e-coupon system achieves traceability against misbehaving users’ choices without
introducing significant computation cost.
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Table 9.2: Comparison with Other E-Coupon Systems in terms of Computation
Cost
Scheme Computation cost
KeyGen Issue Redeem
U S U S U S
Scheme 1 [CES+05] 0 0 4E 2E (k + 3)E 0
Scheme 2 [Ngu06b] 0 (k + 2)E 3E + 2P 11E + 5P 20E + 2P 7E + 5P
PPE-COUPON-I (k + 1)E 1E 10E 3E 5E (2n+ 6)E
PPE-COUPON-II (k + 1)E 1E 10E 3E 6E (2n+ 7)E
9.7 Summary
In this chapter, we formalized the notion of user privacy for e-coupon systems. We
proposed two practical e-coupon systems that can maintain anonymity and user
privacy for honest users, while the identity (and also the choices in the second
system) of a misbehaving user could be traced by the service provider. We achieved
these without requiring any third party in the system. In addition, we formalized
the security models for our e-coupon systems and proved that our new e-coupon
systems are proven secure under the proposed security models.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the summary of our contributions in this thesis and some
potential directions of future work.
10.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we investigate several cryptographic primitives including proxy signa-
ture, oblivious transfer and e-coupon system, in which the users only have restricted
capabilities. The contributions of this thesis can be summarized in the following
six aspects: k-time proxy signature that only allows a proxy signer to generate a
constant number proxy signatures in the name of an original signer; attribute-based
signing right delegation benefiting from both attribute-based signature and proxy
signature; we identify a practical attack that has been neglected in one type of
delegation-by-warrant proxy signature scheme and propose one generic solution to
thwart the attack; a practical e-coupon system is proposed which enables the coupon
issuer to trace the identities of misbehaving users without involvement of a trusted
third party; an OT scheme with retrievable receiver’s privacy; and another multiple-
use e-coupon system which is based on our OT scheme and allows the coupon issuer
to trace both the identities and choices of dishonest users. The specific contributions
in each aspect listed above are summarized as follows.
In chapter 4, we propose a k-time proxy signature scheme, in which a legitimate
proxy signer is only able to issue a pre-determined number of signature in the name
of an original signer. The proposed scheme performs better than existing proxy
signature schemes in prevent proxy signers from misusing their delegated signing
ability. Since in conventional delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes, the
only trick used in restricting the proxy signers’ signing ability is that the original
signers specify the valid time period in the warrants. We define the formal definition
and security model for such a type of proxy signature. We analyse the security of
the proposed k time proxy signature scheme and prove that it is secure under the
proposed security model.
In chapter 5, we construct an attribute-based proxy signature scheme, in which
the original signers are legitimate users with a valid set of attributes delegate the
signing right to the proxy signers with normal public keys. The proposed ABPS
scheme benefits from both proxy signature and attribute-based signature. By veri-
fying an attribute-based proxy signature, a public verifier can be convinced that the
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proxy signature is generated by the proxy signer who has obtained the delegation
from the original signer whose attributes satisfy a pre-claimed predicate. However,
the verifier cannot tell from the signature who is the original signer. Thus, the
proposed scheme ensures an enhanced privacy for the original signer. We provide
the formal definition and adversarial models for attribute-based proxy signature and
prove the security of the proposed scheme using random oracle model.
In chapter 6, we present a practical attack that has been neglected in one type
of delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes. By launching the attack to an
identity-based proxy signature scheme [WMS+07], We demonstrate that a malicious
adversary can successfully forge a proxy signature without being noticed by the
original signer or proxy signer. We revise the existing security model to capture this
attack. Then one solution is proposed to resist this attack. We prove the security of
the revised identity-based proxy signature scheme under the revised security model.
Though we work on one concrete scheme, the weakness in some other proxy signature
schemes can also be fixed by applying the same method.
In chapter 7, we construct an efficient privacy-preserving e-coupon system. Be-
sides all the desirable properties (unforgeability, anonymity and double redemption
detection), we formalize a new property of e-coupon system named user privacy
(privacy of purchase). Another new feature of the proposed e-coupon system is
achieving traceability against dishonest users without involvement of trusted third
party in the tracing phase. We prove the security of the e-coupon system under the
proposed security model and show that the proposed e-coupon system meets all the
secure requirements.
In chapter 8, we propose two novel oblivious transfer schemes, which can be
applied in privacy-sensitive systems to trace the dishonest users’ choices, while the
privacy of honest users is well protected. We revise the half-simulation model [NP05]
to evaluate the security of the proposed OT schemes. Detailed security analysis is
presented to show that the proposed OT schemes are secure under the proposed
security model.
In chapter 9, two novel privacy-preserving e-coupon systems supporting multiple
use of an electronic coupon are proposed. We use our new oblivious transfer scheme
with retrievable receiver’s privacy together with a new blind signature in designing
the e-coupon systems. Besides the basic desirable security properties, the first e-
coupon system allows the coupon issuer to trace the identities of misbehaving users
while the second e-coupon system permits the coupon issuer to reveal both the
identities and choices of the dishonest users. In both e-coupon systems, the privacy
of honest users is well protected. We prove the security of proposed e-coupon systems
under the defined security model and compare them with existing e-coupon systems.
The efficiency analysis shows the proposed e-coupon systems provide comparable
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efficiency.
10.2 Future Work
Though all the proposed schemes have achieved the pre-claimed goals, our work in
this thesis could be further extended in the following aspects.
1. The security of the proposed k-time proxy signature and attribute-based proxy
signature schemes are based on random oracles. Though random oracle has
been proved to be practical in [BR93], there is still controversy in using random
oracle in cryptographic constructions. In fact, there have been some artificial
cryptographic schemes proven secure using random oracles but are trivially
insecure when any real function is substituted for the random oracle [CGH98,
GR04]. Thus, it is of independent interesting to design k-time proxy signature
and attribute-based signature schemes without random oracles to ensure an
enhanced security.
2. We propose an OTRRP scheme and analyse its security under the half-simulation
model [NP05]. In half-simulation model, the security of the sender and re-
ceiver is considered separately. An OT scheme proven secure under the half-
simulation model achieves simulatable security for sender privacy and compu-
tationally indistinguishability for receiver privacy. Recently, the full-simulation
model achieving simulatable security for both the receiver and sender has
been proposed in [CNS07, KN09]. We leave the work of constructing OTRRP
schemes that could be proven secure under full-simulation model as one of our
future work.
3. We can see in the comparison between our proposed e-coupon systems with
existing e-coupon systems [CES+05, Ngu06b] that our e-coupon systems pro-
vide traceability and privacy of purchase, which have not been considered in
previous e-coupons systems. However, our e-coupon systems only achieves
anonymity, which is weaker than unlinkability in [CES+05, Ngu06b]. It has
been an open problem to achieve traceability and unlinkability simultaneously
in one scheme. We leave the construction of e-coupon systems with both
traceability and unlinkability as another future work.
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